Executive Summary
China’s Maritime Toolkit for Ports, Bases, and Dual-Use Facilities
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is transforming commercial maritime infrastructure into a strategic
architecture of in$uence, fusing logistics, diplomacy, and defense in ways that blur the lines between
commercial ports and military power projection. Through its expanding network of port investments,
dual-use facilities, and naval access agreements, China is reshaping the world’s maritime landscape—
and with it, the global balance of power.
Over the past two decades, Chinese state-owned enterprises have gained control or operating stakes
in more than 100 overseas ports and terminals, from Peru’s Chancay megaport to Greece’s Piraeus and
Djibouti’s naval base. Chinese companies operate at more than 100 ports and terminals across the
globe, and China o cially operates one overseas naval base in Djibouti. The People’s Liberation Army
Navy (PLAN) is reportedly developing and retaining a presence at the newly reopened Ream Naval
Base in Cambodia through a joint training and logistics center. Government and expert analysis have
identi ed at least 20 more overseas locations which could become potential host sites to PLAN and
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) facilities. Over the past six years, the PLAN has made dozens of port calls
around the globe—leaving almost no region untouched.
This global footprint allows Beijing to combine economic in$uence, military access, and logistical reach
creating an ecosystem of ports, bases, and digital platforms supporting its military and commercial
objectives. These actions include (1) port investments; (2) port calls; (3) research vessels and blue ocean
missions; (4) diplomacy at sea; (5) gifting, loaning, and sales of equipment; (6) joint maritime exercises
and anti-piracy missions; (7) construction of naval bases and military installations; and (8) shipping and
shipbuilding.
Figure 1: China’s Toolkit for Maritime Statecraft. Figure by the authors.
Each tool is mutually reinforcing, enabling the PRC to project power without overtly deploying it. The
cumulative e!ect is a world where global shipping lanes and logistics networks increasingly depend on
Chinese infrastructure, equipment, and data.
Two events highlight the continuing emphasis Chinese stakeholders place on ports as a means of
power over the past 12 months: the recent acquisition deal of Hutchison’s Panama Canal and its global
ports by a BlackRock-led consortium, which was interrupted by China, and the opening of a new
megaport in Peru.
Implications for the United States and Its Allies
While the United States retains unmatched naval capability, it has a limited domestic commercial
shipping industry, minimal overseas port holdings, and fragmented maritime governance compared
to China’s rapid naval modernization. To sustain deterrence, secure sea lanes, and maintain access to
global trade, Washington and its allies must build an architecture of trust—a coordinated maritime
strategy that integrates defense, commerce, and development. An explicit strategy is imperative given
China’s multifaceted approach around the world.
Since China already cemented a maritime foothold in all regions of the world, there are pressing policy
steps the U.S. government can take in addition to adopting a broader international ports strategy:
Figure 2: The Architecture-Alliance-Alignment Framework. Figure by the authors
.
1. Establish a National Maritime Strategy.
Create a whole-of-government framework to integrate defense, commerce, and development
priorities, led by a new National Security Counsel Senior Director for Maritime Infrastructure.
2. Adopt a Harbor Accord.
Unite allies under common principles for transparency, cyber integrity, and pre-negotiated
surge access at critical ports, modeled after the Artemis Accords for space.
3. Expand and Align the Development Finance Corporation (DFC)’s Maritime and
Transportation Mandate.
Reauthorize the DFC with a dedicated Maritime Infrastructure Window to nance trusted ports
and logistics corridors in partnership with allied operators.
4. Launch a Blue Ports Alliance.
Within the G7, Quad, or Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, coordinate
nancing and certi cation of secure transparent ports akin to the Blue Dot Network.
5. Secure Access and Preposition Resilience.
Negotiate port-access agreements with key Indo-Paci c and Atlantic allies and expand the
Maritime and Tanker Security Programs to guarantee surge capacity.
6. Modernize Maritime Cyber and Dual-Use Infrastructure.
Establish cybersecurity certi cation for cranes, sensors, and logistics platforms; counter LOGINK
proliferation; and promote automation and AI-based resilience.
7. Link Maritime Strategy to Economic Statecraft.
Incorporate port and shipping access into trade, investment, and supply-chain frameworks;
align DFC, Department of State, and Department of Defense tools under a Maritime Resilience
Task Force.
8. Build Public–Private and Academic Capacity.
Expand maritime workforce development and shipbuilding innovation through a joint Maritime
Innovation Lab linking government, industry, and universities.
9. Reinforce the Narrative: Ports as Open Sea Lines of Communication.
Communicate that America’s objective is connection—keeping global ports open, transparent,
and governed by mutually-agreed norms.
China’s maritime expansion is reddening the geography of global influence. The United States and its
allies must construct a maritime architecture of trust that proactively and directly addresses China’s bid
for global maritime statecraft through ports, bases, and dual-use facilities and tools