Dual Use Initiative By China Could Exponentially Increase Its Missile Launch Platforms
Dual Use Initiative By China Could Exponentially Increase Its Missile Launch Platforms
The MOC
By John D. McCown
January 22, 2026
A December 25 article in The War Zone, a prominent online publication focusing on military, defense and technology, included pictures of a small cargo ship packed with containerized missile launchers. The modular outfitting with containers included missile radar equipment and an 11-barrel 30 millimeter close-in weapon system for air defense. The article indicated that most of the deck was covered with containers three lengthwise and five across, each of which included four deployed launch tubes comprising a large vertical launching system (VLS). With 60 cells in total, just that array on a small ship was 63% of the 96 cell VLS on Arleigh Burke class guided missile destroyers.
While containerized weapons systems have been around for years, it is startling to see pictures of them combined in a way that a small cargo ship can easily be transitioned into a lethal naval vessel. Such a transition can be temporary, allowing a return to commercial service in what is the ultimate example of a dual use vessel that results in superior overall cost economics. That China completely outfitted such a vessel in a public area where pictures would emerge indicates a desire for this capability to be seen. The uniform containers and the similar bold Chinese writing on each container is likely touting the capability of this configuration. The line between China’s commercial and military maritime activities is intentionally blurred as a core component of its national Military-Civil Fusion strategy. This approach prioritizes dual use assets, infrastructure and personnel to support both economic growth and the rapid modernization and expansion of the People’s Liberation Army Navy.
There is an inherent scalability in transforming a cargo ship into a missile launch platform that is a function of the underlying vessel size, with larger ships resulting in more capacity. For instance, just a medium size container ship could have such containers laid across the deck in a 12 by 12 pattern, resulting in 576 cells and a VLS firepower six times that of an Arleigh Burke class guided missile destroyer. When augmented by a large rotating phased-array radar mounted atop three containers and other radar and communications gear mounted on other containers along with modular close-in weapons systems for defense, a cargo ship has been turned into a very heavily armed surface combatant. However, modern naval strategy centers on Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) that has shifted away from large vulnerable ships to a dispersed fleet of manned and unmanned vessels. DMO makes sense because it counters advanced adversaries by dispersing forces, making them harder to target. That approach would favor, for instance, ten merchant ships outfitted with 60 launch tubes each instead of one larger merchant ship having the same total number. Perhaps that is precisely why China unveiled a complete transition using such a small vessel.
Today’s navies are in a novel tactical era characterized by their ability to deploy missiles. This has resulted in much research and study related to turning merchant ships into warships with missiles. As the pictures from the December 25 article show, China is far along in testing this approach. However, the U.S. in the last five years has been experimenting with such configurations as highlighted in a February 2025 Proceedings article. That article makes the case that the desired 380-ship fleet and the number of ships is the wrong metric. In a world where the number of missiles the U.S. Navy can bring to bear in a confrontation is of foremost importance, these different weapons systems mounted on cargo vessel platforms prove uniquely attractive. That they can be developed in less time and more cost efficiently than traditional naval vessels only adds to their attractiveness.
What makes a rapid transition from commercial to combatant particularly concerning is to realize how many cargo ship platforms can accommodate this conversion. In that area, the numbers starkly favor China. The UNCTAD data on merchant vessel fleets by flag registry is illuminating. The vessel types most lending themselves to an open transition to warships by putting a single row of modular units on deck are container ships and dry bulk carriers. Container ships can immediately accommodate such modular units while most dry bulk carriers can with minimal adaptations. Based on June 2025 UNCTAD data, Chinese and Hong Kong flag vessels in container ship and dry bulk categories total 4,339 ships or just over 20% of the worldwide total. That is almost 70 times the U.S. flag total of 63 ships in those categories. This means that that even if this became a policy priority and funding was allocated toward this, the U.S. cannot meaningfully replicate the dual-use capacity China is able to with our own merchant fleet.
The examples above refer to overt transitions of cargo ships into armed ships. The covert use of such technology widens the applicability and range of how and where it can be deployed. It also extends on the DMO approach as even a single 40’ container could hide a deployable missile that could be launched at sea or even at an inland point destination. Ukraine made use of a similar covert approach with its Operation Spiderweb that had containers moved far into Russia. At the predetermined location, the container roof was remotely opened and the drones took off with many reaching targets in a Russian airfield.
Not only are such covert usages of containerized weapons systems harder to detect, but also they can potentially be utilized by more entities including rouge states and even terrorists. In February 2024, Iran test fired two ballistic missiles launched from standard 40’ containers at sea. When it is recognized that there are currently the equivalent of 28 million of these 40’ x 8’ x 8.5’ steel boxes existing in the world, any one of which could hide an extraordinarily powerful weapon, the scope of this security issue becomes more apparent. That is a chilling number of platforms that can potentially be placed virtually anywhere.
The ability to leverage merchant fleets based on this technology adds another reason to why the U.S. needs to step-up its efforts to have more ships registered here, particularly dual use container ships. The imperative to add to sealift capacity has never been clearer. It is reassuring that there is a renewed awareness by policy makers in Washington D.C. on the critical importance of sealift. The catalyst for this is China and the growing awareness of the possibility of an invasion of Taiwan. The sealift needs to counter such an invasion would be significant.
This technology serves to widen the gap between the U.S. and China in key maritime segments. The U.S. should expand on research and planning related to what is involved in turning our and our allies merchant ships into warships. At the same time more is learned about offensive capabilities, a robust effort must be made to develop defenses against the covert use of this technology. That starts by requiring that all cargo moving in boxes to or from the U.S. goes in smart containers showing all movements, door openings and various other readings. When merged with bill of lading data and RFID tag data of the actual cargo loaded into a container, a digital twin is created allowing the relevant agencies to screen for potential threats. Who gets access to the trove of digital data that would result from full smart container implementation will cause intramural issues, but with strong U.S. leadership and a commitment it will be used solely to access threats, carriers and all parties should cooperate. Beyond the security protection those smart containers will provide, there are tangible commercial advantages to shippers that will invariably improve supply chains. The digital technology behind smart containers is critical infrastructure and an area the U.S. has the capability to lead and that should be a stated imperative. The most secure smart containers will be ones built in the U.S.
My August 2025 article made the clear case for more U.S. flag ships operating internationally in order to address our sealift needs. The article also noted the constructive role our allies in South Korea and Japan can play in revitalizing the U.S. shipbuilding industry. This theme of rejuvenating America’s shipbuilding base was also covered in an excellent Center for Maritime Strategy article by Julian Guevara that began with Alfred Thayer Mahan’s “Whoever rules the seas rules the world” quote. Mahan’s seminal work guided much of U.S. policy for a century, but around the time the U.S. began to move away from it, China began embracing it. We should find ways to navigate back to the course Mahan illuminated.
John D. McCown is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Center for Maritime Strategy. Mr. McCown has four decades of experience related to the shipping industry. His research, analysis and writings for the Center for Maritime Strategy focus on the intersection of merchant shipping and maritime commerce with national security.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
By John D. McCown
A December 25 article in The War Zone, a prominent online publication focusing on military, defense and technology, included pictures of a small cargo ship packed with containerized missile launchers. The modular outfitting with containers included missile radar equipment and an 11-barrel 30 millimeter close-in weapon system for air defense. The article indicated that most of the deck was covered with containers three lengthwise and five across, each of which included four deployed launch tubes comprising a large vertical launching system (VLS). With 60 cells in total, just that array on a small ship was 63% of the 96 cell VLS on Arleigh Burke class guided missile destroyers.
While containerized weapons systems have been around for years, it is startling to see pictures of them combined in a way that a small cargo ship can easily be transitioned into a lethal naval vessel. Such a transition can be temporary, allowing a return to commercial service in what is the ultimate example of a dual use vessel that results in superior overall cost economics. That China completely outfitted such a vessel in a public area where pictures would emerge indicates a desire for this capability to be seen. The uniform containers and the similar bold Chinese writing on each container is likely touting the capability of this configuration. The line between China’s commercial and military maritime activities is intentionally blurred as a core component of its national Military-Civil Fusion strategy. This approach prioritizes dual use assets, infrastructure and personnel to support both economic growth and the rapid modernization and expansion of the People’s Liberation Army Navy.
There is an inherent scalability in transforming a cargo ship into a missile launch platform that is a function of the underlying vessel size, with larger ships resulting in more capacity. For instance, just a medium size container ship could have such containers laid across the deck in a 12 by 12 pattern, resulting in 576 cells and a VLS firepower six times that of an Arleigh Burke class guided missile destroyer. When augmented by a large rotating phased-array radar mounted atop three containers and other radar and communications gear mounted on other containers along with modular close-in weapons systems for defense, a cargo ship has been turned into a very heavily armed surface combatant. However, modern naval strategy centers on Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) that has shifted away from large vulnerable ships to a dispersed fleet of manned and unmanned vessels. DMO makes sense because it counters advanced adversaries by dispersing forces, making them harder to target. That approach would favor, for instance, ten merchant ships outfitted with 60 launch tubes each instead of one larger merchant ship having the same total number. Perhaps that is precisely why China unveiled a complete transition using such a small vessel.
Today’s navies are in a novel tactical era characterized by their ability to deploy missiles. This has resulted in much research and study related to turning merchant ships into warships with missiles. As the pictures from the December 25 article show, China is far along in testing this approach. However, the U.S. in the last five years has been experimenting with such configurations as highlighted in a February 2025 Proceedings article. That article makes the case that the desired 380-ship fleet and the number of ships is the wrong metric. In a world where the number of missiles the U.S. Navy can bring to bear in a confrontation is of foremost importance, these different weapons systems mounted on cargo vessel platforms prove uniquely attractive. That they can be developed in less time and more cost efficiently than traditional naval vessels only adds to their attractiveness.
What makes a rapid transition from commercial to combatant particularly concerning is to realize how many cargo ship platforms can accommodate this conversion. In that area, the numbers starkly favor China. The UNCTAD data on merchant vessel fleets by flag registry is illuminating. The vessel types most lending themselves to an open transition to warships by putting a single row of modular units on deck are container ships and dry bulk carriers. Container ships can immediately accommodate such modular units while most dry bulk carriers can with minimal adaptations. Based on June 2025 UNCTAD data, Chinese and Hong Kong flag vessels in container ship and dry bulk categories total 4,339 ships or just over 20% of the worldwide total. That is almost 70 times the U.S. flag total of 63 ships in those categories. This means that that even if this became a policy priority and funding was allocated toward this, the U.S. cannot meaningfully replicate the dual-use capacity China is able to with our own merchant fleet.
The examples above refer to overt transitions of cargo ships into armed ships. The covert use of such technology widens the applicability and range of how and where it can be deployed. It also extends on the DMO approach as even a single 40’ container could hide a deployable missile that could be launched at sea or even at an inland point destination. Ukraine made use of a similar covert approach with its Operation Spiderweb that had containers moved far into Russia. At the predetermined location, the container roof was remotely opened and the drones took off with many reaching targets in a Russian airfield.
Not only are such covert usages of containerized weapons systems harder to detect, but also they can potentially be utilized by more entities including rouge states and even terrorists. In February 2024, Iran test fired two ballistic missiles launched from standard 40’ containers at sea. When it is recognized that there are currently the equivalent of 28 million of these 40’ x 8’ x 8.5’ steel boxes existing in the world, any one of which could hide an extraordinarily powerful weapon, the scope of this security issue becomes more apparent. That is a chilling number of platforms that can potentially be placed virtually anywhere.
The ability to leverage merchant fleets based on this technology adds another reason to why the U.S. needs to step-up its efforts to have more ships registered here, particularly dual use container ships. The imperative to add to sealift capacity has never been clearer. It is reassuring that there is a renewed awareness by policy makers in Washington D.C. on the critical importance of sealift. The catalyst for this is China and the growing awareness of the possibility of an invasion of Taiwan. The sealift needs to counter such an invasion would be significant.
This technology serves to widen the gap between the U.S. and China in key maritime segments. The U.S. should expand on research and planning related to what is involved in turning our and our allies merchant ships into warships. At the same time more is learned about offensive capabilities, a robust effort must be made to develop defenses against the covert use of this technology. That starts by requiring that all cargo moving in boxes to or from the U.S. goes in smart containers showing all movements, door openings and various other readings. When merged with bill of lading data and RFID tag data of the actual cargo loaded into a container, a digital twin is created allowing the relevant agencies to screen for potential threats. Who gets access to the trove of digital data that would result from full smart container implementation will cause intramural issues, but with strong U.S. leadership and a commitment it will be used solely to access threats, carriers and all parties should cooperate. Beyond the security protection those smart containers will provide, there are tangible commercial advantages to shippers that will invariably improve supply chains. The digital technology behind smart containers is critical infrastructure and an area the U.S. has the capability to lead and that should be a stated imperative. The most secure smart containers will be ones built in the U.S.
My August 2025 article made the clear case for more U.S. flag ships operating internationally in order to address our sealift needs. The article also noted the constructive role our allies in South Korea and Japan can play in revitalizing the U.S. shipbuilding industry. This theme of rejuvenating America’s shipbuilding base was also covered in an excellent Center for Maritime Strategy article by Julian Guevara that began with Alfred Thayer Mahan’s “Whoever rules the seas rules the world” quote. Mahan’s seminal work guided much of U.S. policy for a century, but around the time the U.S. began to move away from it, China began embracing it. We should find ways to navigate back to the course Mahan illuminated.
John D. McCown is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Center for Maritime Strategy. Mr. McCown has four decades of experience related to the shipping industry. His research, analysis and writings for the Center for Maritime Strategy focus on the intersection of merchant shipping and maritime commerce with national security.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.