The U.S. Must Take the Lead in a Destabilized, Increasingly Militarized Arctic Part 2
- Published August 14, 2024
- By James G. Foggo III and Russell J. Handy
- An increasingly militarized regionThe Arctic was once known as a region of peaceful cooperation but is now becoming better known for its militarization. Many Arctic and non-Arctic nations now operate their warships and submarines in the Arctic Ocean, and there is no regulatory body to provide deconfliction or risk mitigation when different navies interact.
Seven of the eight Arctic Council nations are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and this allows for coordination and cooperation amongst those members’ navies, but neither Russia nor China has a seat at the table in NATO headquarters.
Accordingly, the Arctic region risks becoming a proving ground for large-scale exercises and testing and experimentation of Western, Russian and Chinese weapons of war. Russia has long used the North to conduct weapons testing. It is currently conducting sea trials of its mammoth new submarine, Belgorod, which is capable of deploying a nuclear-powered deep diving mini-sub and the dual-use Poseidon torpedo with long ranges that can traverse the Atlantic Ocean.
Likewise, the Russians have perfected hypersonic weapons, already employed in the Ukraine conflict, and the Arctic proving ground offers another area for testing and evaluation. Some Russian icebreakers are even capable of being armed with the Kalibr cruise missile, which is similar to the U.S. Tomahawk cruise missile.
Putin has also been expanding Russia’s global interests by strengthening partnerships with China and North Korea, while courting regimes across Africa and Asia. It is only a matter of time before the Chinese exploit their growing partnership with Russia in the High North by conducting military operations in the Arctic region.
We should not be surprised in the next few years when a Chinese nuclear submarine surfaces at the North Pole.
China’s interest in the Arctic is part of their long-term strategy of domination, including the development of strategic infrastructure. The Chinese have been in the market for an Arctic operating base for more than a decade to complete President Xi’s “One Belt, One Road” strategy.
In order to facilitate operations on the “Polar Silk Road,” the Chinese know that they must ensure a robust intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and communications architecture in space, thereby placing them in direct competition for bandwidth and orbits over the polar region.
As the ice melts, it will present opportunities for seeding new networks of critical undersea infrastructure (CUI) in the form of pipelines or communication cables, as well as the opportunity to interdict existing or future networks of CUI from Western nations.
The West falls behind
The Western allies are woefully behind in the race to establish an enduring presence in the Arctic region.
For the U.S. Navy, while submarines periodically operate in the High North, we no longer build surface warships fit for Arctic operations. The U.S. Coast Guard has one 48-year-old heavy icebreaker, Polar Star, and we have fallen behind in the timeline for delivery of a replacement. The planned U.S. Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (PSC) is not scheduled to deliver until 2028, nor deploy until 2030 or later.
As a gap filler, the Coast Guard is considering the leasing of one commercial icebreaker while we wait for the arrival of the PSC. Though the Coast Guard’s medium icebreaker, Healy, has traditionally conducted the research missions of the Arctic, it is insufficient to fulfill the presence, research and law enforcement missions demanded by the evolving strategic environment.
By contrast, the Russians have more than 50 icebreakers, some of which are nuclear powered, giving them the ability to remain on station indefinitely. Likewise, the Chinese are following suit and building their own icebreaker fleet.
In order to compete in the polar region, it would be premature to flood the area with warships or icebreakers without a robust supporting infrastructure. Domain awareness and communications capabilities are at the forefront of requirements. Frankly, we have ignored the development of networks over the poles due to competing priorities.
There is currently limited capacity for Western geosynchronous orbiting satellites over the poles as well as limited land based supporting infrastructure. SpaceX has launched more than 5,000 Starlink satellites in the last few years. Intended for commercial use, Starlink has quickly adapted to military requirements, particularly during the war in Ukraine. The network currently has 200 dedicated satellites over in the polar region, but it is insufficient to rely on a sole source commercial solution to solve the current gap in bandwidth and military requirements.
Essential next steps
Clearly, more must be done.
U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) has identified the critical need and is programming resources to fill the void. Meanwhile, we should take advantage of commercial solutions and provide incentives for others to follow suit.
The Saint Lawrence Island, which is part of Alaska, presents both a strategic foothold in the Bering Sea and opportunities for infrastructure investment. Since the Saint Lawrence Island is sovereign U.S. territory, it would be prudent to base the first tranche of land-based infrastructure in support of space operations there with deference to environmental concerns.
The need for infrastructure in the Arctic is not just pertinent to the ability of the U.S. to maintain a presence in the region and ensure freedom of passage through the global commons. The tangible threat to the homeland represented by Russia, and increasingly China, necessitates a close look at this issue in the context of our ability to effectively defend the homeland.
Specifically, substantial gaps exist in Arctic domain awareness and in the ability to command and control homeland defense forces in the far reaches of the region. A robust ability to communicate and to move data across the broad expanse of the Arctic is essential to both. The existing communications backbone organic to the Department of Defense (DOD) is wholly inadequate to the task, but there is strong potential to leverage commercial assets currently in place and planned for the future. DoD must redouble its efforts to engage with commercial partners if they are to invest commensurately in the capabilities required to meet defense needs.
While the U.S. and its allies face numerous problems around the world, we cannot ignore the Arctic region which serves as the “Trans-Polar Bridge” linking the Atlantic and Pacific theaters of operation. Investment is required now in order to build the infrastructure, operational capabilities, tactics, and procedures to ensure successful Arctic deterrence and defense.
A comprehensive strategy that advocates for a robust public-private partnership is needed to increase secure and non-secure internet connectivity, adequate satellite coverage to support multiple secure and non-secure communications architectures, undersea critical infrastructure that provides redundancy in vulnerable satellite communications architectures and persistent stare and continuous orbits of space-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets.
Failure to do so has serious consequences for Western powers in light of both Russia and China’s aggressive commercial and military buildup in the region.
James G. Foggo III and Russell J. Handy
Adm. James G. Foggo III (U.S. Navy, ret.) is dean of the Center for Maritime Strategy and an adviser for Stellar Solutions, Inc. He previously served as commander of U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa and commander of Allied Joint Force Command Naples. Lt. Gen. Russell J. Handy (U.S. Air Force, ret.) is an independent aerospace defense contractor and an adviser for Stellar Solutions, Inc. He previously served as commander of Alaskan North American Aerospace Defense Region, Alaskan Command, and Eleventh Air Force at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska.