The recent Ukrainian drone strike on Russia’s strategic aircraft fleet has raised serious concerns within Washington’s defense community about the threat posed by unmanned aerial systems (UAS) to U.S. bases and assets. General David Allen, the Air Force’s highest-ranking officer, called the attack an “eyebrow-raising moment”. And his counterpart in the Army, General Randy George, stressed the need to speed up procurement cycles to manage the “cat-and-mouse game with counter-UAS”. This event, however, should not merely serve as a wake-up call for the Army and Air Force; it should also be a clear call to action for the U.S. Navy.
Codenamed Operation Spider’s Web, Kyiv’s innovative attack involved 117 drones piloted by artificial intelligence (AI) via Russia’s telecommunications system. Ukrainian operatives smuggled these inexpensive delivery platforms into Russia over several months, carefully hiding them inside mundane, truck-mounted wooden sheds. On the day of the strike, Ukraine’s Security Service remotely opened these containers, releasing their destructive cargo near four Russian installations. The operation destroyed a total of twelve strategic bombers, including aircraft stationed at Belaya Airbase—a facility located 4,850 km from Kyiv.
Not to be outdone, Israel recently launched its own surprise drone attack on unsuspecting Iranian air defense units as part of Operation Rising Lion. The exact details of this covert raid remain limited; however, Israeli media has reported that Mossad agents deployed quadcopters and other loitering weapons “from trucks smuggled into the country and a drone base hidden somewhere near Tehran”. These attacks paved the way for 200 Israeli jets to strike Iranian military and nuclear sites deep within defended airspace.
Long before Israel and Ukraine carried out these clandestine attacks, the U.S. military was already struggling to protect highly sensitive sites. In December 2023, dozens of twenty-foot drones flew over Langley Air Force Base in Virginia for seventeen consecutive days. The incursions became so frequent that the base commander canceled scheduled training missions and moved F-22 fighter jets to another facility. Of particular significance for the Navy, these drones often continued south after passing over Langley, following a route that crossed the Chesapeake Bay and Naval Station Norfolk, the homeport for approximately 75 American ships.
The lesson from these incidents is clear: like aircraft, U.S. warships are vulnerable to drones, especially when moored pier side. While underway, America’s advanced fleet has enough firepower, watch standers, and detection methods to track, identify, and defeat a Ukrainian-style drone attack. The inherent mobility of ships at sea, as well as their stand-off distance from land, also protect against short-range UAS. A true, coordinated swarm could overwhelm these defenses, and a prolonged conflict would deplete America’s limited stock of expensive, high-tech missile interceptors. Nonetheless, the threat is less severe, and the Navy has already outfitted the recently deployed Ford Strike Group with Raytheon and Andril’s more affordable Coyote and Roadrunner counter-UAS systems.
The threat to American warships in port, however, remains significant. The Navy primarily designed its current security infrastructure to prevent surface attacks, including those involving waterborne improvised explosive devices. Installed in part after al-Qaeda’s suicide bombing of the USS Cole in 2000, this infrastructure includes harbor patrol craft, waterline security lights, and port security barriers. These security elements may stop an unmanned surface vessel; nevertheless, they will not impede a UAS flying at an altitude of 100 feet.
A recent counter-espionage probe underscored this vulnerability. In 2024, the Federal Bureau of Investigation arrested Fengyun Shi, a Chinese national, after he took pictures of Huntington Ingalls’ (HII) Newport News Shipyard and other “classified naval installations”. The U.S. government only uncovered Shi’s attempted espionage after he accidentally flew his drone into a tree just outside HII’s facility. When the drone finally fell from its arboreal perch, authorities seized the SIM card, discovering midnight photos of facilities actively constructing nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and Virginia-class submarines.
As Shi’s brazen espionage illustrates, modern technology has made America’s waterside installations particularly vulnerable. Naval Station Mayport is a good example of this development. Located directly at the confluence of the St. Johns River and the Atlantic Ocean, this base is the homeport for twelve Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. The facility sits only seven nautical miles from both an approved offshore anchorage and Jacksonville’s commercial port facilities on Blount Island. Every year, merchant vessels transit the narrow channel that runs directly along the station’s northern perimeter approximately 1,500 times.
It would not take a great deal of creativity to exploit these shipping patterns and geographical features for nefarious ends. An American adversary, including the Chinese, could easily deploy medium-sized drones aboard a merchant vessel bound for Jacksonville. Hidden within shipping containers, foreign operatives could remotely deploy these UASs from either the offshore anchorage or the commercial shipping terminal. Medium-sized drones employed in this scenario are unlikely to sink Naval Station Mayport’s 9,000-ton warships; however, they could target critical topside radars, communications equipment, and electronic warfare sensors.
Such a strike could cause multiple mission kills. An Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, for instance, has several SPY-1 radar arrays: a crucial part of the ship’s Aegis combat system. Without these sensors, the warship is essentially blind in a high-end fight. Moreover, Raytheon manufactures these radars in only one specialized facility in Andover, Massachusetts. A well-planned strike on Naval Station Mayport—targeting this specialized equipment—could easily disable multiple U.S. Navy units for an extended period.
Amid the globalized economy, these types of covert attacks are becoming easier to carry out. Each month, the United States imports approximately 2.4 million twenty-foot equivalent units aboard thousands of ships. Trucks and trains then transport these standardized containers to millions of destinations nationwide. To the average U.S. service member or base security guard, these mechanisms of the global economy are a routine and familiar sight—part of the logistical background of everyday life. And yet, this mundanity is precisely the characteristic Ukrainian and Israeli operatives exploited in their successful attacks.
Nevertheless, these two nations are not the first countries to weaponize commercial disguises to facilitate covert strikes. There is also a long history of navies using commercial camouflage to attack enemy ships. During World War One, Winston Churchill and the British Admiralty converted several “small freighters, tramp steamers, [and] motor drifters” into disguised gunboats manned by Royal Navy crews. These vessels, known as Q-ships, relied on their commercial appearances to ambush surfaced German U-boats, luring enemy submarines into close range before launching devastating broadsides from their hidden guns. As long as the element of surprise lasted, this tactic proved effective, with Q-ships sinking twelve U-boats during the war.
The Germans, not to be outdone, employed a similar tactic during World War Two. In addition to submarines and surface raiders, the Kriegsmarine deployed auxiliary cruisers to attack British trade convoys. These converted merchant ships carried a suite of naval guns concealed behind “false bulkheads or what appeared to be crates of deck cargo.” Sailing as traders, auxiliary ships approached Allied merchantmen “as innocent neutrals, dropping their disguise at the last minute to open fire.” This tactic proved remarkably effective. In the summer and fall of 1940, German auxiliary cruisers sank or captured 80 Allied ships, including the HMAS Sydney: an Australian light cruiser, whose wreckage divers only discovered in 2008.
As these historical examples illustrate, Ukraine and Israel are only updating a well-worn tactic with modern technology and disguises. Nonetheless, these updates are critical and provide substantial offensive advantages. Drones, for example, increase the reach of any attacker and are straightforward to conceal, particularly compared to large naval guns. The ubiquity of modern containers is also a significant advantage, allowing ships to offload their cargo in port and pre-position hidden munitions at numerous commercial facilities along the U.S. coastline.
Such an attack would have significant strategic consequences. In addition to the potential equipment losses mentioned earlier, this type of strike would immediately expand the battlefield’s depth, preventing the U.S. Navy from maintaining a secure base of operations. It would also likely serve as the initial component of an attritional strategy aimed at quickly reducing the size of any maritime force Washington could deploy in a crisis.
Just like its counterparts in the Air Force and Army, the U.S. Navy must learn from Ukraine’s and Israel’s covert drone strikes. America’s warships, like Moscow’s strategic bombers, remain vulnerable, especially while docked at their home ports. To address this modern threat, the Navy will need to strengthen its current security posture. There is good news on this front. The Marine Corps, the other service within the Department of the Navy, has already designed and deployed a robust counter-UAS platform. Known as the Marine Air Defense Integrated System (MADIS), this platform can detect, track, and neutralize a wide range of UASs.
The military has deployed multiple variants of this system with Marine expeditionary units, and the USS Boxer recently used MADIS to counter an Iranian drone while transiting the Strait of Hormuz. The U.S. Navy should act swiftly to leverage these intra-departmental assets. Such prescient action will prevent operational surprise and ensure America’s fleet remains secure at home and ready for worldwide deployment.
LT Matthew Walker is a surface warfare officer in the U.S. Navy and a second-year graduate student at Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program. He is also a research intern at the Center for Maritime Strategy.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
By Matthew Walker
The recent Ukrainian drone strike on Russia’s strategic aircraft fleet has raised serious concerns within Washington’s defense community about the threat posed by unmanned aerial systems (UAS) to U.S. bases and assets. General David Allen, the Air Force’s highest-ranking officer, called the attack an “eyebrow-raising moment”. And his counterpart in the Army, General Randy George, stressed the need to speed up procurement cycles to manage the “cat-and-mouse game with counter-UAS”. This event, however, should not merely serve as a wake-up call for the Army and Air Force; it should also be a clear call to action for the U.S. Navy.
Codenamed Operation Spider’s Web, Kyiv’s innovative attack involved 117 drones piloted by artificial intelligence (AI) via Russia’s telecommunications system. Ukrainian operatives smuggled these inexpensive delivery platforms into Russia over several months, carefully hiding them inside mundane, truck-mounted wooden sheds. On the day of the strike, Ukraine’s Security Service remotely opened these containers, releasing their destructive cargo near four Russian installations. The operation destroyed a total of twelve strategic bombers, including aircraft stationed at Belaya Airbase—a facility located 4,850 km from Kyiv.
Not to be outdone, Israel recently launched its own surprise drone attack on unsuspecting Iranian air defense units as part of Operation Rising Lion. The exact details of this covert raid remain limited; however, Israeli media has reported that Mossad agents deployed quadcopters and other loitering weapons “from trucks smuggled into the country and a drone base hidden somewhere near Tehran”. These attacks paved the way for 200 Israeli jets to strike Iranian military and nuclear sites deep within defended airspace.
Long before Israel and Ukraine carried out these clandestine attacks, the U.S. military was already struggling to protect highly sensitive sites. In December 2023, dozens of twenty-foot drones flew over Langley Air Force Base in Virginia for seventeen consecutive days. The incursions became so frequent that the base commander canceled scheduled training missions and moved F-22 fighter jets to another facility. Of particular significance for the Navy, these drones often continued south after passing over Langley, following a route that crossed the Chesapeake Bay and Naval Station Norfolk, the homeport for approximately 75 American ships.
The lesson from these incidents is clear: like aircraft, U.S. warships are vulnerable to drones, especially when moored pier side. While underway, America’s advanced fleet has enough firepower, watch standers, and detection methods to track, identify, and defeat a Ukrainian-style drone attack. The inherent mobility of ships at sea, as well as their stand-off distance from land, also protect against short-range UAS. A true, coordinated swarm could overwhelm these defenses, and a prolonged conflict would deplete America’s limited stock of expensive, high-tech missile interceptors. Nonetheless, the threat is less severe, and the Navy has already outfitted the recently deployed Ford Strike Group with Raytheon and Andril’s more affordable Coyote and Roadrunner counter-UAS systems.
The threat to American warships in port, however, remains significant. The Navy primarily designed its current security infrastructure to prevent surface attacks, including those involving waterborne improvised explosive devices. Installed in part after al-Qaeda’s suicide bombing of the USS Cole in 2000, this infrastructure includes harbor patrol craft, waterline security lights, and port security barriers. These security elements may stop an unmanned surface vessel; nevertheless, they will not impede a UAS flying at an altitude of 100 feet.
A recent counter-espionage probe underscored this vulnerability. In 2024, the Federal Bureau of Investigation arrested Fengyun Shi, a Chinese national, after he took pictures of Huntington Ingalls’ (HII) Newport News Shipyard and other “classified naval installations”. The U.S. government only uncovered Shi’s attempted espionage after he accidentally flew his drone into a tree just outside HII’s facility. When the drone finally fell from its arboreal perch, authorities seized the SIM card, discovering midnight photos of facilities actively constructing nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and Virginia-class submarines.
As Shi’s brazen espionage illustrates, modern technology has made America’s waterside installations particularly vulnerable. Naval Station Mayport is a good example of this development. Located directly at the confluence of the St. Johns River and the Atlantic Ocean, this base is the homeport for twelve Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. The facility sits only seven nautical miles from both an approved offshore anchorage and Jacksonville’s commercial port facilities on Blount Island. Every year, merchant vessels transit the narrow channel that runs directly along the station’s northern perimeter approximately 1,500 times.
It would not take a great deal of creativity to exploit these shipping patterns and geographical features for nefarious ends. An American adversary, including the Chinese, could easily deploy medium-sized drones aboard a merchant vessel bound for Jacksonville. Hidden within shipping containers, foreign operatives could remotely deploy these UASs from either the offshore anchorage or the commercial shipping terminal. Medium-sized drones employed in this scenario are unlikely to sink Naval Station Mayport’s 9,000-ton warships; however, they could target critical topside radars, communications equipment, and electronic warfare sensors.
Such a strike could cause multiple mission kills. An Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, for instance, has several SPY-1 radar arrays: a crucial part of the ship’s Aegis combat system. Without these sensors, the warship is essentially blind in a high-end fight. Moreover, Raytheon manufactures these radars in only one specialized facility in Andover, Massachusetts. A well-planned strike on Naval Station Mayport—targeting this specialized equipment—could easily disable multiple U.S. Navy units for an extended period.
Amid the globalized economy, these types of covert attacks are becoming easier to carry out. Each month, the United States imports approximately 2.4 million twenty-foot equivalent units aboard thousands of ships. Trucks and trains then transport these standardized containers to millions of destinations nationwide. To the average U.S. service member or base security guard, these mechanisms of the global economy are a routine and familiar sight—part of the logistical background of everyday life. And yet, this mundanity is precisely the characteristic Ukrainian and Israeli operatives exploited in their successful attacks.
Nevertheless, these two nations are not the first countries to weaponize commercial disguises to facilitate covert strikes. There is also a long history of navies using commercial camouflage to attack enemy ships. During World War One, Winston Churchill and the British Admiralty converted several “small freighters, tramp steamers, [and] motor drifters” into disguised gunboats manned by Royal Navy crews. These vessels, known as Q-ships, relied on their commercial appearances to ambush surfaced German U-boats, luring enemy submarines into close range before launching devastating broadsides from their hidden guns. As long as the element of surprise lasted, this tactic proved effective, with Q-ships sinking twelve U-boats during the war.
The Germans, not to be outdone, employed a similar tactic during World War Two. In addition to submarines and surface raiders, the Kriegsmarine deployed auxiliary cruisers to attack British trade convoys. These converted merchant ships carried a suite of naval guns concealed behind “false bulkheads or what appeared to be crates of deck cargo.” Sailing as traders, auxiliary ships approached Allied merchantmen “as innocent neutrals, dropping their disguise at the last minute to open fire.” This tactic proved remarkably effective. In the summer and fall of 1940, German auxiliary cruisers sank or captured 80 Allied ships, including the HMAS Sydney: an Australian light cruiser, whose wreckage divers only discovered in 2008.
As these historical examples illustrate, Ukraine and Israel are only updating a well-worn tactic with modern technology and disguises. Nonetheless, these updates are critical and provide substantial offensive advantages. Drones, for example, increase the reach of any attacker and are straightforward to conceal, particularly compared to large naval guns. The ubiquity of modern containers is also a significant advantage, allowing ships to offload their cargo in port and pre-position hidden munitions at numerous commercial facilities along the U.S. coastline.
Such an attack would have significant strategic consequences. In addition to the potential equipment losses mentioned earlier, this type of strike would immediately expand the battlefield’s depth, preventing the U.S. Navy from maintaining a secure base of operations. It would also likely serve as the initial component of an attritional strategy aimed at quickly reducing the size of any maritime force Washington could deploy in a crisis.
Just like its counterparts in the Air Force and Army, the U.S. Navy must learn from Ukraine’s and Israel’s covert drone strikes. America’s warships, like Moscow’s strategic bombers, remain vulnerable, especially while docked at their home ports. To address this modern threat, the Navy will need to strengthen its current security posture. There is good news on this front. The Marine Corps, the other service within the Department of the Navy, has already designed and deployed a robust counter-UAS platform. Known as the Marine Air Defense Integrated System (MADIS), this platform can detect, track, and neutralize a wide range of UASs.
The military has deployed multiple variants of this system with Marine expeditionary units, and the USS Boxer recently used MADIS to counter an Iranian drone while transiting the Strait of Hormuz. The U.S. Navy should act swiftly to leverage these intra-departmental assets. Such prescient action will prevent operational surprise and ensure America’s fleet remains secure at home and ready for worldwide deployment.
LT Matthew Walker is a surface warfare officer in the U.S. Navy and a second-year graduate student at Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program. He is also a research intern at the Center for Maritime Strategy.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.