The New Trump Administration and Incoming German Chancellor Merz – Will Berlin and Washington Strengthen Defense Cooperation?
The MOC
By Ewa A. Andryjalowicz, M.A.
March 20, 2025
LinkedInFacebookTwitterEmailPrintFriendly
Germany faces growing defense challenges as Friedrich Merz becomes Chancellor. He will need to balance strong ties with the United States while strengthening Germany’s and Europe’s defense amidst global tensions, especially the threat from Russia. Merz’s decisions will significantly impact Germany’s future and the security of Europe and NATO.
Merz’s defense policy will be tested by two key tasks: increasing investment in the armed forces and bolstering transatlantic cooperation, which the United States—particularly under Donald Trump’s first presidency—has long pushed for. The second term of Trump has raised more expectations for Berlin regarding defense spending.
However, Merz may face resistance from the public, his Christian Democratic Union (CDU/CSU) voters, and his Social Democratic Party (SPD) coalition partners who oppose higher defense spending. His policy’s success will depend on building consensus in the government to gain a majority in parliament to implement the necessary laws and flexibly adapt actions to the changing geopolitical situation. Whether Merz can realize Germany’s defense ambitions will depend on three crucial factors shaping the nation’s future role in NATO and relations with the United States.
First, the future of the Merz government and Germany’s defense policy; second, political blockades in the Bundestag as a challenge for Merz; and third, Germany’s future under Merz between the United States and Europe.
The Future of The Merz Government and Germany’s Defense Policy
First, the new government’s success will depend on whether the CDU/CSU can form a stable coalition with the SPD that will last a full four-year term. The collapse of the previous government on November 5, 2024, demonstrated the fragility of German political alliances. Another early election could damage the economy, weaken transatlantic relations, and hamper the implementation of key defense reforms. Without a stable coalition and strong leadership, it will be nearly impossible to implement ambitious plans in this area
The early elections in Germany resulted in two parties gaining the most votes: the CDU/CSU and Alternative for Germany (AfD), both with similar electoral programs. The CDU/CSU, once considered conservative, has moved toward the center-left in recent years, winning over 28 percent of the vote in the February Bundestag elections. In contrast, the AfD, a right-wing party (often described as populist), won almost 21 percent. During the campaign, Merz presented a position similar to the AfD on migration, economic issues, and security policy. However, this was more of a strategy to lower AfD support than a promise of future cooperation. It is worth adding that while the CDU’s Bavarian regional affiliate CSU maintains a conservative profile, the national CDU increasingly (in state parliaments) forms coalitions with left-wing ideological groups, such as the SPD or the Green Party. Merz has already ruled out the possibility of a coalition with the AfD.
In turn, the SPD, the party of outgoing Chancellor Olaf Scholz, received over 16 percent of the vote, promoting a left-wing program that includes combating climate change, building social housing, and redistributing income. It proposes higher taxes for “the wealthy” despite the current tax rates for the middle class (earnings above 65,000 euros) already being 42 percent. In addition, the SPD supports an open migration policy and opposes the CDU/CSU’s defense policy, including sending Taurus missiles to Ukraine and deploying anti-ballistic missile systems in Germany. The SPD is also known for its “delaying tactics” policy on arms.
The CDU/CSU, on the other hand, is pushing for increased defense spending and stronger transatlantic ties, which is leading to profound differences between potential coalition partners. Merz criticized the Trump administration for siding with Russia and urged Europe to unite, strengthen defenses, and possibly replace NATO with a new alliance system. A joint CDU/CSU and SPD government would require difficult compromises and concessions in key areas.
As the future Chancellor, Merz will face a strategic dilemma: how can Germany increase its defense independence without weakening transatlantic relations? His decisions could affect not only Germany but also the security of Europe, mainly on its eastern borders.
Political Blockades in The Bundestag: A Challenge for The Merz Government
Second, the German Federal Parliament (Bundestag) has 630 members, and if the CDU/CSU forms a coalition with the SPD, the governing parties will have 360 seats. However, the AfD and the far-left (die Linke) have combined won a total of 269 seats, which gives them a so-called “blocking minority,” meaning that they can effectively block any constitutional changes requiring a two-thirds majority of all members of the Bundestag.
This is particularly problematic in the context of the planned amendment by the CDU/CSU and the SPD to increase the state debt limit, which would allow for more significant investment in infrastructure and defense. If the Merz government decides to take such a step, it may encounter strong resistance and significantly complicate its future actions, especially in armament and national security, as key reforms could be completely blocked. Although the AfD supports increased spending on defense and the military, it opposes increasing the national debt. Meanwhile, die Linke consistently rejects any actions leading to an “arms race,” further complicating the situation.
This situation will significantly hamper the Merz government’s implementation of key reforms in the field of security and defense. Many of its initiatives could be effectively blocked without the ability to implement constitutional changes, weakening Germany’s international position and military capabilities.
Germany’s Future Under Merz: Between The United States and Europe
Third, Friedrich Merz faces a key question regarding Germany’s role in Europe and its relations with the United States, especially in Europe’s growing importance in security policy. He may strive for greater German independence in defense matters; however, it will be challenging to give up close cooperation with the United States.
If Germany establishes a stable government, it will likely increase its defense spending, with Merz advocating for greater independence from the United States and a unified European response to rising geopolitical threats. However, President Trump still expects concrete actions from Berlin to strengthen military, financial, and technological capabilities, not just promises and declarations of cooperation.
Although the CDU/CSU may form a government with the SPD, the future Chancellor will face significant challenges, especially in the budgetary sphere. Since 2023, Germany has been recording a decline in GDP, rising spending, and state debt (and the forecasts for the coming years are not optimistic). Due to the urgent need to increase spending on defense and infrastructure, which has been neglected for almost two decades, Germany will have to consider further expanding the state’s debt. To address the crisis, the government has prepared a bill on spending on infrastructure and defense in the amount of €500 billion.
On March 18, the outgoing Bundestag adopted a constitutional amendment proposed by CDU/CSU and SPD. To secure the Green Party’s support, an extra climate budget was added, leading the Greens to vote in favor. The amendment now awaits approval by the upper chamber of the legislature and, if passed, will allow Germany to bypass the debt brake for increased public spending.
Meanwhile, Eva Högl, the Federal Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces, highlighted key issues in the Bundeswehr’s 2024 annual report, including: dilapidated barracks, a lack of drones and digital equipment, and €67 billion in infrastructure needs despite €1.6 billion allocated for construction and repair.. The total number of soldiers has dropped from 181,807 to 180,976, with 25 percent of recruits dropping out of training.
When Merz takes office as Chancellor next month, he will strive to be more financially independent from the United States but simultaneously wants to maintain close cooperation with the United States, realizing that the new Trump administration will only be ready for long-term cooperation with Germany when the country strengthens its military, financial, technological, and strategic capabilities. For Merz, the key to success in improving and maintaining relations with the United States will be increasing defense spending and convincing the new Trump administration that Germany will be able to meet the growing demands of global security policy. To this end, concrete actions and tangible results from Berlin will be necessary, confirming its willingness to take on greater responsibility in defense and security matters.
Facing the growing tensions with Russia, Friedrich Merz will have to balance maintaining strong ties with the United States and assuming greater responsibility for security in Europe. What decisions will he make regarding the U.S. military presence in Europe, and how will they affect transatlantic relations? However, Merz’s success or failure in this matter will strongly depend on changing geopolitical realities and domestic political concerns, the direction of which are difficult to predict today. They will ultimately decide which of his actions will prove effective and which will encounter resistance and failure.
Ewa A. Andryjalowicz, M.A., is a Researcher, Analyst, and Advisor at the State Parliament in Germany. She is a multilingual international affairs professional with several years of research experience in Defense and Security Policy, concentrating on transatlantic (E.U./U.S.) long-term collaboration. She can be found on LinkedIn or contacted via e-mail at eandryjalowicz@gmail.com.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.