Protecting the Pacific: An Imbalance in U.S. Arctic Strategy
Protecting the Pacific: An Imbalance in U.S. Arctic Strategy
The MOC
By Jack Lindstrom
September 10, 2026
July twenty-fourth of 2024 saw two Russian Tu-95 bombers and two Chinese H-6 bombers fly in tandem over the Chukchi and Bering seas, entering the Alaskan Air Defense Identification Zone. It was the first time NORAD had intercepted Russian and Chinese aircraft flying together near United States (U.S.) airspace. The response was a deployment of American F-16s and F-35s, with Canadian CF-18s, which swiftly intercepted the formation before it could work further into U.S. and Canadian Arctic airspace. Two months after the fact, on September 28th, a U.S. Coast Guard HC-130J identified two China Coast Guard cutters, as well as two Russian Border Guard vessels operating roughly 440 miles southwest of St. Lawrence Island in the Bering Sea. Such an expedition marks the farthest north the China Coast Guard vessels have ever been observed, as well as marking the first ever entry of China Coast Guard ships in the Arctic Ocean. While the events varied in their domain— one was by air and the other was by sea— both display a unity of mission shared by Russia and China in the Arctic.
The North Atlantic serves as the prominent maritime domain of Western powers, with Russia’s Northern Fleet forced to pass through the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom-Norway (GIUK-N) Gap. Russian influence is thereby limited; the GIUK-N Gap is patrolled closely by NATO operations, where the U.S. Navy is largely supported by NATO allies. Additionally, NATO established the Arctic Sentry to better patrol and enforce influence and security across the region, with a particular emphasis on the GIUK-N Gap. The North Pacific, by contrast, sees U.S. action taken by the Coast Guard, with the support of Canada. In such a way, the Coast Guard faces Russia and China acting in tandem with a significantly lesser defense and support system, compared to the North Atlantic. While the respective regions differ in their geography, viability of military routes, and immediate presence of threats, the discrepancy and imbalance nonetheless is a structural gap in U.S. Arctic strategy. That gap is only opening further, precisely as the Pentagon’s own strategy names China, not Russia, as the region’s leading long-term challenge.
Of the eight Arctic states, seven are NATO members; correspondingly, NATO regards the High North as a region of collective responsibility. Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 patrols the GIUK-N Gap as a matter of course– in March of 2025, the Dutch frigate HNLMS Tromp patrolled the corridor alongside Belgian frigate Louise-Marie and the German support ship Rhön. This patrol was deliberately framed around the Russian submarine transit routes stemming from the Kola Peninsula bastion. The HNLMS Tromp utilizes a SMART-L MM/N radar which tracks both airborne and space-based targets, allowing the vessel to patrol not merely the sea but also the skies and space above. The nations operate in such group patrols and exercises, securing the North Atlantic under NATO jurisdiction. The strength of the patrols in the region depends upon radar and ships as well as upon diplomacy, due to this intrinsically alliance-based strategy. The Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro conferenced with Høgni Hoydal, the Faroese minister of foreign affairs. The conference, taking place in August 2024, specifically discussed submarine port access and transit rights through the GIUK-N Gap, and followed a U.S. submarine’s July port call in that exact region. The Navy’s own presence in the Arctic region is thin; however, its presence in the North Atlantic is imperative for NATO security. The burden of protection in the Arctic falls instead to the U.S. Coast Guard, which employs the icebreaker USCGC Healy specifically for High North operations. The USCGC Healy is, at the time of writing, undergoing repairs due to engineering complications experienced on July 13th, 2026. The USCGC Storis, the most recent addition to the Coast Guard’s icebreaker force, has replaced the Healy in the region since. The Storis and Healy before it was the U.S.’s only significant presence in the Arctic Ocean, while the Atlantic flank is protected and patrolled not only by U.S. Naval vessels but also by a significant support system from regional allies. Put bluntly, the U.S. Arctic force in the North Pacific is comparatively isolated, whereas the NATO structure in the North Atlantic provides readily available aid and support, as well as ships in the water.
The 2024 joint China-Russia patrols were not an isolated event; the year before saw Navy warships dispatched to the Aleutians after 11 Chinese and Russian military vessels were operating simultaneously near Kiska Island. By 2025, the Coast Guard was tracking as many as five Chinese icebreaking vessels operating continuously in the Chukchi and Beaufort seas, the largest deployment of Chinese vessels in the regions to date. July 3rd, 2026 witnessed four Chinese icebreaking vessels operating under the 16th Arctic Ocean Expedition the nation has launched. August 15th of 2026 then saw the maiden voyage of China’s Sea Legend Line vessel Dubai Tower depart from China, through Russian waters, to reach Europe. Such a trade route has been a Chinese ambition for some time, under the name of the Polar Silk Road.
The U.S. physical involvement in the Arctic, by comparison, is bleak. Russia operates approximately 40 to 55 icebreakers, eight of which are nuclear-powered, as well as one operating combat icebreaker with three more under construction. China, despite a lack of Arctic coastline, operates four to six icebreakers by some estimates, as well as presently constructing one nuclear-powered icebreaker. The Coast Guard’s 2023 fleet mix, by contrast, operates three- the Storis, commissioned in 2025, and the Healy, undergoing repairs, and the Polar Star, a vessel now 50 years old. The Coast Guard analysis concluded the service needs eight to nine polar icebreakers to meet its Arctic and Antarctic mission requirements, a mission underway through the construction of an additional 11 icebreakers. Despite the progress of construction, the original icebreaker project of Polar Security Cutters has been delayed to March 2033, with estimates for the heavy icebreakers to take until 2039. The 2024 U.S.-Canada-Finland Icebreaker Collaboration Effort, otherwise known as the ICE Pact, marked the acknowledgement that the icebreaker hardware gap was not one that could be reasonably recovered without international coalition effort. Washington treats the gap as an effort of Arctic powers with mutual interests; nonetheless, as Finland carries a significant industrial burden through the project, it also indicates that such an establishment of icebreakers is designed more or less for operation in the North Atlantic- not the Pacific Arctic.
The Department of Defense’s 2024 Arctic Strategy explicitly identifies the People’s Republic of China as the primary nation operating in the Arctic with respect to U.S. national security. It marks the first time the Department of Defense Arctic strategy has identified a nation other than Russia as the primary actor in the Arctic. China is active in the Arctic, increasingly so in tandem with Russia, and is also where the U.S. allied structure and hardware is weakest. NATO’s Article 5 and the history of involvement in the North Atlantic give the region a structural advantage for Western powers; correspondingly, Russia and China have worked directly in the opposite region. China and Russia have built strength where the U.S. and allies have not. The Bering Strait is a physical vulnerability which has seen increased Chinese and Russian traffic and decreased U.S. and NATO focus. The U.S.-Canada cooperation runs through NORAD and the domain of air and missiles, not a maritime treaty body built for cutter and icebreaker competition, and certainly not established to detect Chinese vessels in the Bering Strait the way the Arctic Sentry has been established to watch the GIUK-N Gap. The Atlantic requires submarine involvement, destroyers, and patrol aircraft, which have been built up by the U.S. and NATO regional allies, whereas the Pacific Arctic requires icebreakers and cutters, without any near-term fix. Autonomous systems and submarine patrols established under Operation Ice Camp have reinvigorated the biennial ICEX exercises with renewed value. In March 2026, Vice Adm. Richard Seif personally launched Operation Ice Camp Boarfish- the 100th Arctic under-ice operation in U.S. Navy history; however, a submarine surfacing through the ice once every two years and cutters that can watch a Chinese icebreaker but not out-build or overpower one are forms of detection. They are sensors in the water, but not practical deterrents. NATO provides such a deterrence in the Atlantic, but such a force is absent in the Pacific Arctic.
While faster icebreaker delivery is critical, a hull under construction does not resolve the coalition issue or the presence issue in the short term. Washington should formalize a standing U.S.-Canada Pacific Arctic maritime coordination mechanism to ensure and strengthen an alliance built on NORAD. Ad hoc coast guard-to-coast guard contact provided adequate deterrence and defense when Russian ships patrolled the Bering Sea alone and frequently, and keyly without real intent. It is not adequate in the present day, wherein Russian Border Guard and China Coast Guard vessels patrol in tandem, with a strategic intent. The Atlantic did not gain a coalition by happenstance- NATO and its Arctic Sentry were deliberate actions taken to create a stronger regional force. The Pacific will not gain its own alliances or fleets patrolling chokepoints without diplomatic action and a physical presence.
Jack Lindstrom is an incoming Master of International Affairs candidate at the University of California San Diego’s School of Global Policy and Strategy, where his research focuses on China and Indo-Pacific strategy. He is a junior researcher at the Mackinder Forum and founder of Arctic Ledger, a publication on geoeconomics and critical infrastructure.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
By Jack Lindstrom
July twenty-fourth of 2024 saw two Russian Tu-95 bombers and two Chinese H-6 bombers fly in tandem over the Chukchi and Bering seas, entering the Alaskan Air Defense Identification Zone. It was the first time NORAD had intercepted Russian and Chinese aircraft flying together near United States (U.S.) airspace. The response was a deployment of American F-16s and F-35s, with Canadian CF-18s, which swiftly intercepted the formation before it could work further into U.S. and Canadian Arctic airspace. Two months after the fact, on September 28th, a U.S. Coast Guard HC-130J identified two China Coast Guard cutters, as well as two Russian Border Guard vessels operating roughly 440 miles southwest of St. Lawrence Island in the Bering Sea. Such an expedition marks the farthest north the China Coast Guard vessels have ever been observed, as well as marking the first ever entry of China Coast Guard ships in the Arctic Ocean. While the events varied in their domain— one was by air and the other was by sea— both display a unity of mission shared by Russia and China in the Arctic.
The North Atlantic serves as the prominent maritime domain of Western powers, with Russia’s Northern Fleet forced to pass through the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom-Norway (GIUK-N) Gap. Russian influence is thereby limited; the GIUK-N Gap is patrolled closely by NATO operations, where the U.S. Navy is largely supported by NATO allies. Additionally, NATO established the Arctic Sentry to better patrol and enforce influence and security across the region, with a particular emphasis on the GIUK-N Gap. The North Pacific, by contrast, sees U.S. action taken by the Coast Guard, with the support of Canada. In such a way, the Coast Guard faces Russia and China acting in tandem with a significantly lesser defense and support system, compared to the North Atlantic. While the respective regions differ in their geography, viability of military routes, and immediate presence of threats, the discrepancy and imbalance nonetheless is a structural gap in U.S. Arctic strategy. That gap is only opening further, precisely as the Pentagon’s own strategy names China, not Russia, as the region’s leading long-term challenge.
Of the eight Arctic states, seven are NATO members; correspondingly, NATO regards the High North as a region of collective responsibility. Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 patrols the GIUK-N Gap as a matter of course– in March of 2025, the Dutch frigate HNLMS Tromp patrolled the corridor alongside Belgian frigate Louise-Marie and the German support ship Rhön. This patrol was deliberately framed around the Russian submarine transit routes stemming from the Kola Peninsula bastion. The HNLMS Tromp utilizes a SMART-L MM/N radar which tracks both airborne and space-based targets, allowing the vessel to patrol not merely the sea but also the skies and space above. The nations operate in such group patrols and exercises, securing the North Atlantic under NATO jurisdiction. The strength of the patrols in the region depends upon radar and ships as well as upon diplomacy, due to this intrinsically alliance-based strategy. The Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro conferenced with Høgni Hoydal, the Faroese minister of foreign affairs. The conference, taking place in August 2024, specifically discussed submarine port access and transit rights through the GIUK-N Gap, and followed a U.S. submarine’s July port call in that exact region. The Navy’s own presence in the Arctic region is thin; however, its presence in the North Atlantic is imperative for NATO security. The burden of protection in the Arctic falls instead to the U.S. Coast Guard, which employs the icebreaker USCGC Healy specifically for High North operations. The USCGC Healy is, at the time of writing, undergoing repairs due to engineering complications experienced on July 13th, 2026. The USCGC Storis, the most recent addition to the Coast Guard’s icebreaker force, has replaced the Healy in the region since. The Storis and Healy before it was the U.S.’s only significant presence in the Arctic Ocean, while the Atlantic flank is protected and patrolled not only by U.S. Naval vessels but also by a significant support system from regional allies. Put bluntly, the U.S. Arctic force in the North Pacific is comparatively isolated, whereas the NATO structure in the North Atlantic provides readily available aid and support, as well as ships in the water.
The 2024 joint China-Russia patrols were not an isolated event; the year before saw Navy warships dispatched to the Aleutians after 11 Chinese and Russian military vessels were operating simultaneously near Kiska Island. By 2025, the Coast Guard was tracking as many as five Chinese icebreaking vessels operating continuously in the Chukchi and Beaufort seas, the largest deployment of Chinese vessels in the regions to date. July 3rd, 2026 witnessed four Chinese icebreaking vessels operating under the 16th Arctic Ocean Expedition the nation has launched. August 15th of 2026 then saw the maiden voyage of China’s Sea Legend Line vessel Dubai Tower depart from China, through Russian waters, to reach Europe. Such a trade route has been a Chinese ambition for some time, under the name of the Polar Silk Road.
The U.S. physical involvement in the Arctic, by comparison, is bleak. Russia operates approximately 40 to 55 icebreakers, eight of which are nuclear-powered, as well as one operating combat icebreaker with three more under construction. China, despite a lack of Arctic coastline, operates four to six icebreakers by some estimates, as well as presently constructing one nuclear-powered icebreaker. The Coast Guard’s 2023 fleet mix, by contrast, operates three- the Storis, commissioned in 2025, and the Healy, undergoing repairs, and the Polar Star, a vessel now 50 years old. The Coast Guard analysis concluded the service needs eight to nine polar icebreakers to meet its Arctic and Antarctic mission requirements, a mission underway through the construction of an additional 11 icebreakers. Despite the progress of construction, the original icebreaker project of Polar Security Cutters has been delayed to March 2033, with estimates for the heavy icebreakers to take until 2039. The 2024 U.S.-Canada-Finland Icebreaker Collaboration Effort, otherwise known as the ICE Pact, marked the acknowledgement that the icebreaker hardware gap was not one that could be reasonably recovered without international coalition effort. Washington treats the gap as an effort of Arctic powers with mutual interests; nonetheless, as Finland carries a significant industrial burden through the project, it also indicates that such an establishment of icebreakers is designed more or less for operation in the North Atlantic- not the Pacific Arctic.
The Department of Defense’s 2024 Arctic Strategy explicitly identifies the People’s Republic of China as the primary nation operating in the Arctic with respect to U.S. national security. It marks the first time the Department of Defense Arctic strategy has identified a nation other than Russia as the primary actor in the Arctic. China is active in the Arctic, increasingly so in tandem with Russia, and is also where the U.S. allied structure and hardware is weakest. NATO’s Article 5 and the history of involvement in the North Atlantic give the region a structural advantage for Western powers; correspondingly, Russia and China have worked directly in the opposite region. China and Russia have built strength where the U.S. and allies have not. The Bering Strait is a physical vulnerability which has seen increased Chinese and Russian traffic and decreased U.S. and NATO focus. The U.S.-Canada cooperation runs through NORAD and the domain of air and missiles, not a maritime treaty body built for cutter and icebreaker competition, and certainly not established to detect Chinese vessels in the Bering Strait the way the Arctic Sentry has been established to watch the GIUK-N Gap. The Atlantic requires submarine involvement, destroyers, and patrol aircraft, which have been built up by the U.S. and NATO regional allies, whereas the Pacific Arctic requires icebreakers and cutters, without any near-term fix. Autonomous systems and submarine patrols established under Operation Ice Camp have reinvigorated the biennial ICEX exercises with renewed value. In March 2026, Vice Adm. Richard Seif personally launched Operation Ice Camp Boarfish- the 100th Arctic under-ice operation in U.S. Navy history; however, a submarine surfacing through the ice once every two years and cutters that can watch a Chinese icebreaker but not out-build or overpower one are forms of detection. They are sensors in the water, but not practical deterrents. NATO provides such a deterrence in the Atlantic, but such a force is absent in the Pacific Arctic.
While faster icebreaker delivery is critical, a hull under construction does not resolve the coalition issue or the presence issue in the short term. Washington should formalize a standing U.S.-Canada Pacific Arctic maritime coordination mechanism to ensure and strengthen an alliance built on NORAD. Ad hoc coast guard-to-coast guard contact provided adequate deterrence and defense when Russian ships patrolled the Bering Sea alone and frequently, and keyly without real intent. It is not adequate in the present day, wherein Russian Border Guard and China Coast Guard vessels patrol in tandem, with a strategic intent. The Atlantic did not gain a coalition by happenstance- NATO and its Arctic Sentry were deliberate actions taken to create a stronger regional force. The Pacific will not gain its own alliances or fleets patrolling chokepoints without diplomatic action and a physical presence.
Jack Lindstrom is an incoming Master of International Affairs candidate at the University of California San Diego’s School of Global Policy and Strategy, where his research focuses on China and Indo-Pacific strategy. He is a junior researcher at the Mackinder Forum and founder of Arctic Ledger, a publication on geoeconomics and critical infrastructure.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.