Foreword
By Admiral James G. Foggo, USN (ret.)
Dean of the Center for Maritime Strategy
The Center for Maritime Strategy is delighted to partner with the Wahba Initiative for Strategic
Competition to bring you this insightful monograph. chronicles China’s meteoric
rise in the maritime domain over the last two decades. The study presents a cautionary tale of how a
rising power that once yielded to American sea power is now able to flex its muscles outside the first
and second island chains while simultaneously expanding its global reach. Unlike many other studies
written on this topic, “Ports of Power” is not content to simply identify and admire the problem. Rather,
this study others solutions to mitigate the risk of a Chinese monopoly in maritime infrastructure around
the world and a strategy to compete with Beijing in this domain.
China’s rise can be attributed to a variety of factors. While the United States was distracted by the
Global War on Terror, China incrementally expanded its global reach with President Xi’s “Belt and Road
Initiative” (BRI).1 China now dominates the commercial shipbuilding industry, with over 50 percent of
the world’s commercial track sailing under a Chinese $ag.2 China has leveraged its investments and
loans to debtor nations in a strategic and calculated way, giving China control of more than 60 percent
of the world’s port facilities. According to container shipping expert John McCown, “China now builds
50 percent of the world’s container ships, 97 percent of container equipment, 70 percent of container
cranes, controls 14 percent of container ships by $ag, represents 40 percent of worldwide volume, and
controls or has investments in 357 international container terminals in 63 different countries.”3 China
has maximized its industrial capacity, particularly in the maritime domain where it can now outproduce
any other western nation in terms of simultaneous commercial or warship production.
China accomplished all of this under the radar while Western powers, in particular the United States
of America, became complacent and distracted. Complacency set in after the breakup of the Soviet
Union in 1991, the period during which well-known scholar Francis Fukuyama famously referred to as
“The End of History.” Western powers divested from a Cold War defensive posture and instead relied
on crisis response. The United States downsized its presence in Europe, shuttering or departing from
strategically important bases like Keflavik, Iceland while reducing American troop strength on the
continent.
Furthermore, Al Qaeda’s attack on the homeland on 9/11 was a “Pearl Harbor” moment for the United
States. America demanded retribution, and Congress and the Bush Administration mobilized to
respond. This resulted in two “forever wars” that led the U. S. military to Iraq under the pretense of
destroying Saddam Husein’s “clandestine” nuclear program and to Afghanistan to not only eliminate Al
Qaeda, but to build a nation that would preclude terrorist networks from ever using Afghanistan as a
base of operations in the future.
Accordingly, America’s strategy and defense budget became increasingly focused on
counterinsurgency operations and littoral warfare in support of forces ashore. In fact, Marines
debarked from their traditional habitat aboard afloat platforms and moved ashore, becoming a
heavy, self-sustained force relaying on its own air cover and res (tanks and artillery). Baseline defense
budgets were inadequate to cover battle eld requirements in support of the Global War on Terror, so
supplemental authorizations became the norm, contributing to an increase in the national debt. In
fact, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Sta! Admiral Mike Mullen cautioned during and after his
service that the greatest threat to our national security is its national debt.5 Twenty years after 9/11, the
United States effectively withdrew from both war zones, with Iraq more or less able to function as an
independent state and Afghanistan collapsing into a complete failure.
In the interim, China took advantage of America’s distraction and deployed all the tools of diplomatic,
informational, military, and economic power to establish relationships with strategic partners around
the globe. As needed, China frequently employed lawfare and economic warfare to coerce weaker
nations within its sphere of influence to cooperate. In his rst term, President Barack Obama extended
America’s engagement in the “forever wars,” but dedicated his second term to reducing America’s
footprint in Europe and the Middle East and instead articulating a pivot to the Paci c. President Obama
rebalanced the fleet with 60 percent of battle force ships moved to the Pacific theater of operations
while at the same time engaging the Chinese in targeted diplomacy.
The rst meeting between President Obama and President Xi took place in Sunnyland, California in
June 2013 and became known as the Sunnyland Summit.6 During this summit, both sides agreed to
explore options to discuss regional security issues including North Korea and non-proliferation, cyber
security and the protection of intellectual property, climate change, and a “new model of major country
relations” to include risk mitigation measures applied to both of our naval forces operating in close
proximity to one another. Chief of Naval Operations Jonathan Greenert was delegated the latter task
by National Security Advisor Susan Rice upon conclusion of the Sunnyland Summit. Admiral Greenert
subsequently directed that I take the lead as his representative in negotiations with the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) Navy concerning “Rules of Behavior in the Maritime Domain.” This was a tall task
and there was no pre-existing framework for conducting such a negotiation with the PLA Navy.
Coincident with the Sunnyland maritime discussion, China enthusiastically agreed to host the 14th
Western Paci c Naval Symposium in Qingdao, China whereby China took the lead in advocating the
“Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea” (CUES), a series of measures that can be taken to alleviate
uncertainty and mitigate risk when any warship experiences a chance encounter with another warship
on the high seas during peacetime.7 CUES is patterned after the INCSEA Agreement between the
United States and Russia that has prevented countless untoward incidents between the two countries’
warships since its inception in 1972. By taking the lead on CUES, China appeared to be serious about
risk mitigation during encounters on the high seas—a positive sign for potential cooperation between
the two nations as I embarked on my first trip to Beijing. My Chinese counterpart was fluent in English
and known to his staff only somewhat jokingly as the “Chief Barbarian Handler.” We Americans were the
barbarians.
The negotiations were painstakingly slow, as both sides distrusted the other and were initially unable
to even agree on the title of the agreement. While the Chinese favored an agreement centered around
“rules” of behavior in the maritime domain, the American side preferred a title emphasizing “standards”
of behavior in order to give commanding officers some latitude. In hopes of breaking the logjam, I
met one-on-one with the Chief Barbarian Handler, who asked me a simple question: “Admiral Foggo,
do you know why we are here?” My answer was equally as simple: “To determine the standards of
behavior in the maritime domain between our two navies.” He disagreed, and he opined that we were
there to ensure that, if our two nations ever went to war, it would be based on a decision made by
President Xi or President Obama, not the men in the cockpit of an airplane or on the bridge of a ship!8
The implication of his statement was that these diplomatic efforts should be focused on preventing
accidental war resulting from miscalculation or escalation emanating from disputes in the maritime
domain—an assessment which underscored the potential for naval conflicts between China and the
United States to potentially balloon into something far bigger and more dangerous.
2
I agreed wholeheartedly with his assessment, and we agreed to settle on the title of “Rules of Behavior
in the Maritime Domain” in order to get on with the real crux of the discussions, i.e., how to avoid an
escalation between our respective navies in stressful situations on the high seas. In fact, we did just
that. The agreement was signed by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel and his Chinese counterpart in
November 2014. In the final analysis, the Memorandum of Understanding Between the Department of
Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic
of China Regarding the Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters remains one of the
only concrete accomplishments in the Sino-American relationship in the aftermath of the Obama-Xi
Sunnyland Summit.
As I departed the Pentagon in December 2014 for
my next assignment as Commander, U.S. Sixth Fleet
in Naples, Italy, I believed America’s diplomatic
engagement with China had actually accomplished
something worthwhile that would contribute to
peaceful coexistence between the PLA Navy and
U.S. Navy in the South China Sea. It soon became
apparent that the Chinese had other goals in mind.
What may have started as an erstwhile effort to
mitigate risk was soon discarded as the Chinese
built up their BRI infrastructure around the world to
support both commercial and military operations.
While China stayed true to its promise to avoid the
type of risky encounters this agreement envisioned,
Photo from the author’s collection taken during the talks at PRC Naval
Headquarters in Beijing, China (2013) with Chinese counterparts.
it simultaneously sought to gain an edge over the United States through more covert means, extending
its influence across the globe through a series of infrastructure projects and bilateral engagements
centered around increasing Chinese commercial and military presence in key geostrategic locations.
“Ports of Power” explains the pathway and the methodology China employed to establish its current
foothold in global ports around the world. This study is more than just a list of Chinese port facilities
and capabilities that have popped up around the globe in the last twenty years. Rather, “Ports of Power”
articulates the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) strategy to attain maritime dominance. The authors
meticulously articulate a classic “ends, ways and means” strategy by revealing the PRC’s maritime
“tool kit” for ports, bases, and dual-use facilities. The tool kit contains the eight ways in which China
will achieve its goals, which include (1) port investments, (2) port calls, (3) research vessels and blue
exploration missions, (4) medical diplomacy at sea, (5) gifting and loaning of equipment, (6) joint
maritime exercises, (7) overseas bases and facilities, and (8) shipbuilding and shipping. All of these tools
are discussed in more detail in the report to include individual case studies that illustrate the manner in
which the PRC is employing these tools.
China’s primary mechanisms for deploying these tools are its three major shipping companies (COSCO,
China Merchants Ports, and Hong Kong-based Hutchinson Port Holdings) which represent a whopping
80 percent of China’s port projects abroad. These companies and their extensive economic ties across
the globe enable the PRC to project power without overtly deploying it. China’s advantage is in its
ability to develop and sustain a long-term strategy that mirrors President Xi’s concept of the “China
Dream.” China does not waffle in execution of strategy, nor does it change every four or eight years
commensurate with a change in administration. When the Chinese Communist Party decides on a
course of action, it sticks to it. The United States would be wise to adopt similar practices.
Furthermore, China has proven itself to be good at taking risks and capitalizing on its failures. Take the
case of Sri Lanka for example. China invested heavily in Sri Lanka because of its strategic location and
the fact that it contains the deep-water port in Hambantota. I’m certain that China’s investors were not
happy when Sri Lanka defaulted on its loans, but China turned this around to its advantage by securing
a 99-year lease of the port of Hambantota.10
]
China is also good at experimentation and adaptation. China watched the U.S. Navy operate from Camp
Lemmonier, Djibouti in the Horn of Africa for a decade before negotiating a deal with the government
of Djibouti to establish what America has traditionally referred to as a “cooperative security location”
down the road from the American base. China’s selection of real estate was optimized by having
access to water. What started as a small footprint grew into a much larger footprint, and today the PRC
base in Doraleh, Djibouti represents China’s rst overseas naval base.11 With a modern extended pier,
Doraleh can host a Chinese aircraft carrier, and likely will in the near future. As the study explains, the
PRC has been incredibly strategic in choosing where to invest in establishing a maritime presence. As
China probes locations around the globe and eventually plants its $ag, it takes a deliberate approach
in determining if there is utility in expanding a commercial facility to a dual-use facility. China’s
forethought, combined with its strategic and tactical patience, generally pays o!, particularly in the
case of its base at Doraleh. All of this has contributed to China’s new ability to project power by means
of its modern blue water navy.
In fact, China has surpassed the U.S. Navy in terms of total battle force ships, now exceeding 370
warships as compared to America’s 297 ships (soon to be 290 ships by 2030). While many argue that
the quality and capability of U.S. warships exceed that of the PLA Navy, particularly when it comes to
the comparison of the Ford-class aircraft carrier to its Chinese counterpart Fujian, China is advancing
quickly and claims to have incorporated electromagnetic assisted launch on the flight deck. Chinese
Luyang III destroyers are similar to the Arleigh Burke-class Flight III DDGs and, while the United States
sundowns its Ticonderoga-class cruisers, China has fielded the Renhai-class cruiser—an impressive
warship by all accounts. In the undersea domain, the United States is still the world’s dominant force,
but both China and Russia are investing in both manned and unmanned undersea platforms. I remain
concerned that the “No-Limits” partnership that President Xi has brokered with President Putin could
lead to a technology transfer in which China could leap forward one or two generations in submarine
stealth and technology.12 As China’s navy continues to ascend in strength, its web of maritime power
described in this report will allow Beijing to deploy its navy in ways which can increasingly challenge
American sea power and threaten to disrupt the global order.
Fortunately, “Ports of Power” does not leave readers with a sense of hopelessness in the face of a rising
China. On the contrary, it presents us with a clarion call to action by outlining a series of steps the
United States and other Western powers can take to compete with China and mitigate the risk of PRC
dominance in the maritime domain.
First, America needs a comprehensive National Maritime Strategy that supports both national and
economic security. Second, the establishment of a “Harbor Accord” is essential to ensure transparency
and collective security against a variety of threats. Third, the United States should take the lead in
international port infrastructure by expanding the mandate and footprint of the U.S. International
Development Finance Corporation to counter the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. For example, the
United States is backing the transformation of the Elefsina (Eleusis) shipyard and port near Athens into
a major commercial and logistics hub, using it as a strategic, Western-aligned alternative to the Chinese
controlled Piraeus port. The U.S. Development Finance Corporation provided a $125 million loan to
facilitate the port’s rehabilitation. Fourth, to complement port development, the United States should
take the lead on a Blue Ports Alliance of like-minded nations that wish to ensure safe and unimpeded
access for goods and services. Fifth, it is essential that the United States and its allies establish a
more robust network of regional hubs for fuel and consumable distribution. While the United States
does have a modest plan to increase the Tanker Security Program with the addition of “console”
tankers, it is insufficient to meet the needs of a fleet on a wartime posture. Sixth, in conjunction with
the Blue Port Alliance, it is essential that America make its network of overseas infrastructure more
resilient against cyberattacks and reduce the dependency on Chinese crane services. Seventh, while
instituting a comprehensive maritime strategy is a good start, America must ensure that this is a
whole of government effort that includes the Departments of Defense, Treasury, Commerce, Justice,
and Transportation. With 90 percent of its commerce traveling by sea, America’s economic security
depends on the robustness of its maritime security. Eighth, it will be important to establish public
private partnerships to accomplish America’s goals in the maritime domain, and the United States
must leverage the power of both public and private academic institutions like the Merchant Marine
Academy or other service academies, California Maritime, MIT Woods Hole, and the Webb Institute.
Ninth and finally, America must ensure a robust strategic communications plan that links sea lines of
communications to worldwide port infrastructure.
“Ports of Power” explains how we got here and provides solutions to counterbalance the threat of a
Chinese monopoly on the system of global maritime infrastructure. It is a well-crafted study and should
be required reading at America’s war colleges, service academies, and industry or institutions working
in the eld of maritime commerce. It is only by heeding the lessons of this report that the United States
and its allies will be able to counter Chinese influence before it is too late.