Part 2 of 3 To Fight Future Wars, the U.S. Needs More Capacity—and Seriousness
Silver or Steel?
The origins of such mindsets typically come from misinterpreting historical lessons and current events. Enthusiasm for blockading China, in addition to avoiding the horrors and costs of direct confrontation, is inspired by U.S. success in its submarine campaign against Imperial Japan in World War II. The strangulation of supply lines to Japan’s home islands from its resource-rich conquests was one of the key reasons for the empire’s defeat. Indeed, modern submarines would be supremely useful in prosecuting a long war against China, since it is also dependent on overseas trade and access to resources.
But Byers says there are three principal challenges to remember when it comes to blockading China. First, citing J.C. Wylie, a Cold War-era U.S. Navy rear admiral and historian, Byers points out that the three-and-a-half-year submarine campaign against Japan worked in tandem with hard-fought air, naval and ground campaigns on other Pacific fronts that cost the U.S. hundreds of ships, tens of thousands of aircraft and over a hundred thousand lives. Second, China today has thousands of merchant ships, and going after them will take a long time. Many American ships, submarines and aircraft will be needed to contain Chinese forces inside the first island chain. And third, the very act of stepping back from a forward defense of Taiwan removes U.S. forces as a deterrent to a Chinese invasion. If Taiwan falls as a result, there will be tremendous international and domestic pressure on the U.S. to make peace, undermining the long-war blockade approach.
There are myriad other issues to contend with in a blockade strategy, such as going after Chinese vessels in neutral waters, dealing with Chinese cargo on neutral vessels and handling vociferous international opposition to U.S. actions. Byers says that none of this is insurmountable and blockade could be a useful part of a Taiwan Strait crisis response. However, he warns policymakers against thinking of it as a lower-cost, lower-risk alternative to direct military intervention. To be sure, it comes with its own sizable risks.
The same could be said for the U.S. taking lessons from current events and reaching the same dubious conclusion that a mass-casualty confrontation can be avoided while saving Taiwan. One of these ideas gaining currency is that the U.S. will be able to drone its way out of casualties with swarms of cheap, remotely piloted and autonomous vehicles of various types. This lesson, by way of the Russia-Ukraine war, is informing alternative strategies and research and development guidance all the way up to the top reaches of the Pentagon.
While much has been written and broadcast about the revolutionary effect of drones on the war in Ukraine for both sides, these sources tend to talk past each other and eschew the use of a common terminology. All this serves to confuse rather than enlighten. Much of the battlefield impact of modified commercial drones, such as quadcopters, is because the lines are relatively static and the opposing forces are close to each other. This will not be the case in a battle for the Taiwan Strait.
A whole article would be needed to describe the taxonomy of drones, so for the purposes of drone swarms in the Taiwan Strait, I mean a variety of remotely operated and autonomous systems that are essentially loitering munitions, small cruise missiles, boats and submersibles. Proponents of the so-called Hellscape concept of throwing drones at a Chinese invasion force cite the effectiveness of aerial systems in Ukraine and other conflicts, as well as Ukraine’s ability to neutralize the Russian Black Sea Fleet with aerial and naval attack drones.
While Hellscape critics are not opposed to U.S. acquisition of such weapons per se, they don’t believe these weapons should be a substitute for existing types of needed missiles and munitions, not to mention more ships and planes. Naval blogger CDR Salamander writes that Hellscape is an example of the Pentagon wading into a brand new concept requiring new research and development, program awards, acquisitions and fielding—all of which require funding and, more importantly, time. Most of what would be needed to realize Hellscape remains undefined, which means it is probably years if not decades away from deployment. This is typical of Defense Department thinking: Forgo proven weapons today in the expectation of developing superior alternatives tomorrow.