For more than three-quarters of a century, the U.S. Navy has been a major driver of nuclear energy in the United States. Beginning with Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, the legendary “Father of the Nuclear Navy,” visionaries of maritime strategy have recognized the benefits of nuclear power for both naval vessels and civilian communities. At a time of wide-ranging threats to American security, and in a world where energy is one of the most vital factors in a nation’s strength, policymakers have many reasons to build on Rickover’s legacy.
America commissioned the world’s first nuclear-powered submarine, USS Nautilus (SSN-571), in 1954, and the first nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, USS Enterprise (CVN-65), in 1961. During the Cold War, fleets of SSNs and CVNs became key elements of the Navy’s ability to confront the Soviet Union at sea. Meanwhile, strategic missile submarines (SSBNs) came to form the sea leg of America’s nuclear triad—from 1959 to 1967, the Navy commissioned 41 of them, the “41 for Freedom.”
Today, CVNs are America’s primary tool for projecting power across vast oceans. During a crisis, an American president will ask, where are the carriers? SSBNs are the most survivable leg of the triad. And through the AUKUS partnership with Australia and the United Kingdom, the U.S. is developing SSNs that will empower all three countries to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific.
There is even more nuclear power can do for American maritime security. Expanding nuclear propulsion to more types of vessels can take some pressure off the Navy’s workhorses, guided missile destroyers. Nuclear propulsion can help revive America’s shipping and shipbuilding industries, as well as the Merchant Marine. And introducing reactors to some of America’s more distant communities can help guarantee them reliable energy— with implications for sealift.
The same year Enterprise put to sea, the Navy commissioned its first nuclear-powered guided missile cruiser, USS Long Beach (CGN-9). The U.S. built a total of nine CGNs during the Cold War, with the last, USS Arkansas, commissioned in 1980. As part of the post-Cold War “peace dividend,” however, all nine were decommissioned between 1993 and 1999.
Reliable access to large supplies of oil—needed to power Arleigh Burke class destroyers—is never guaranteed. In a 2021 article in Proceedings, Andrea K. Orlowski, deputy director of engineering at Military Sealift Command, warned, “In any fight in the western Pacific in the coming decades, the Navy is likely to run out of gas.” She attributed this risk to a shortage of capacity in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR).
Even though the SPR “stands at its lowest level since the 1980s,” in the words ofNewsweek, White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt announced in June that the Trump administration has no plans to replenish it. While the government would be wise to begin filling the SPR soon (a $20 billion task that will take several years), the low amount of oil available in case of national emergencies is a reason for the Navy to strongly consider new nuclear-powered surface ships to complement those powered by petroleum. Diversifying energy sources would hedge against sudden oil shocks.
In a Proceedingsarticle from July 2025, LCDR Jordan Spector called for building more nuclear-fueled surface vessels. He argued that a nuclear-powered ship would be better able to simultaneously surge all its offensive and defensive systems – including future directed energy weapons – than a petroleum-fueled one. Noting the United Kingdom’s exploration of small modular reactors for Royal Navy surface ships, LCDR Spector advocated using AUKUS as a platform through which the U.S. can share the related development costs with two close allies. This suggestion is one the Navy should strongly consider.
In a 2023 article in Forbes, security analyst Craig Hooper urged the Navy to develop nuclear-powered auxiliary vessels and freight carriers. Pointing to Project Pele, a multiagency effort to develop a mobile nuclear reactor, he called for efforts to “marinize” small-scale nuclear by building on existing federal efforts. Hooper warned that the promise of this technology is such that if America does not lead in developing it for the maritime arena, China will.
Taking this logic further, nuclear energy has a role to play in America’s civilian shipping sector as well. In a chapter of Returning From Ebb Tide: Renewing the United States Commercial Maritime Enterprise, experts Thomas Davies and Sanjana Shashikumar argue that building nuclear-powered vessels can help revive the American shipbuilding industry. “Advanced nuclear technology,” they write, “can be a transformative force, bolstering the U.S. merchant marine sector while strengthening national security and economic competitiveness.”
There is another way in which nuclear technology can help ensure America has a strong maritime sector. Expanding nuclear power in key locations can blunt an argument against a law that helps preserve America’s maritime industry for national security reasons. Passed in 1920—after World War I showed the U.S. how vulnerable its merchant fleet was—the Jones Act requires cargo going between any two U.S. ports to be transported on ships that are American-flagged, American-built, at least 75% American-owned, and at least 75% crewed by American citizens.
While the Jones Act supports around 650,000 jobs in the maritime industries, it also has a significant benefit for national security. It provides American merchant mariners with opportunities to hone their skills. It keeps them prepared in case of war, during which they will be essential—over 90% of military supplies and equipment are transported by ships, since aircraft generally are not large or strong enough.
In another chapter of Returning from Ebb Tide, CMS Non-Resident Senior Fellow John D. McCown Jr. analyzes the Jones Act’s effect on shipping costs. He concludes that only 9% of the cost of shipping between U.S. posts is due to the law’s requirements. Denying the Merchant Marine the ability to prepare for their contribution to a major war effort would drown out the small economic gain from repealing the Jones Act.
It is common for critics of the Jones Act to cite its effects on Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico. Separated geographically from the Continental United States, shipping products to these two states and one territory from CONUS is often costlier than shipping between two ports in the lower 48. Their remoteness also affects their mix of energy sources: they rely more heavily on petroleum for electricity than the lower 48. In 2024, for example, petroleum provided 62% of Puerto Rico’s electricity, and accounted for about 90% of Hawaii’s total energy consumption.
Nuclear energy can relieve these pressures. In Alaska, Eielson Air Force Base is set to host the first commercial microreactor used by the Armed Forces, a technology that could then be applied to the civilian economy. Although Hawaii’s constitution forbids the use of nuclear energy, it faces such an uphill battle in its push for non-fossil energy that some lawmakers want to reconsider this law and are calling for studies on the feasibility of nuclear reactors in their state. Nuclear is also a viable option for Puerto Rico, where support for it has grown in recent years.
Nuclear energy’s potential for maritime security affects both the sea services and communities on land. This technology is one that the U.S. should embrace for both its defense and economic benefits. It is a choice that would make Admiral Rickover proud.
Michael D. Purzycki is an analyst, writer, and editor based in Arlington, Virginia. He has worked for the United States Navy, Marine Corps, and Army.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
By Michael Purzycki
For more than three-quarters of a century, the U.S. Navy has been a major driver of nuclear energy in the United States. Beginning with Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, the legendary “Father of the Nuclear Navy,” visionaries of maritime strategy have recognized the benefits of nuclear power for both naval vessels and civilian communities. At a time of wide-ranging threats to American security, and in a world where energy is one of the most vital factors in a nation’s strength, policymakers have many reasons to build on Rickover’s legacy.
America commissioned the world’s first nuclear-powered submarine, USS Nautilus (SSN-571), in 1954, and the first nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, USS Enterprise (CVN-65), in 1961. During the Cold War, fleets of SSNs and CVNs became key elements of the Navy’s ability to confront the Soviet Union at sea. Meanwhile, strategic missile submarines (SSBNs) came to form the sea leg of America’s nuclear triad—from 1959 to 1967, the Navy commissioned 41 of them, the “41 for Freedom.”
Today, CVNs are America’s primary tool for projecting power across vast oceans. During a crisis, an American president will ask, where are the carriers? SSBNs are the most survivable leg of the triad. And through the AUKUS partnership with Australia and the United Kingdom, the U.S. is developing SSNs that will empower all three countries to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific.
There is even more nuclear power can do for American maritime security. Expanding nuclear propulsion to more types of vessels can take some pressure off the Navy’s workhorses, guided missile destroyers. Nuclear propulsion can help revive America’s shipping and shipbuilding industries, as well as the Merchant Marine. And introducing reactors to some of America’s more distant communities can help guarantee them reliable energy— with implications for sealift.
The same year Enterprise put to sea, the Navy commissioned its first nuclear-powered guided missile cruiser, USS Long Beach (CGN-9). The U.S. built a total of nine CGNs during the Cold War, with the last, USS Arkansas, commissioned in 1980. As part of the post-Cold War “peace dividend,” however, all nine were decommissioned between 1993 and 1999.
Reliable access to large supplies of oil—needed to power Arleigh Burke class destroyers—is never guaranteed. In a 2021 article in Proceedings, Andrea K. Orlowski, deputy director of engineering at Military Sealift Command, warned, “In any fight in the western Pacific in the coming decades, the Navy is likely to run out of gas.” She attributed this risk to a shortage of capacity in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR).
Even though the SPR “stands at its lowest level since the 1980s,” in the words of Newsweek, White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt announced in June that the Trump administration has no plans to replenish it. While the government would be wise to begin filling the SPR soon (a $20 billion task that will take several years), the low amount of oil available in case of national emergencies is a reason for the Navy to strongly consider new nuclear-powered surface ships to complement those powered by petroleum. Diversifying energy sources would hedge against sudden oil shocks.
In a Proceedings article from July 2025, LCDR Jordan Spector called for building more nuclear-fueled surface vessels. He argued that a nuclear-powered ship would be better able to simultaneously surge all its offensive and defensive systems – including future directed energy weapons – than a petroleum-fueled one. Noting the United Kingdom’s exploration of small modular reactors for Royal Navy surface ships, LCDR Spector advocated using AUKUS as a platform through which the U.S. can share the related development costs with two close allies. This suggestion is one the Navy should strongly consider.
In a 2023 article in Forbes, security analyst Craig Hooper urged the Navy to develop nuclear-powered auxiliary vessels and freight carriers. Pointing to Project Pele, a multiagency effort to develop a mobile nuclear reactor, he called for efforts to “marinize” small-scale nuclear by building on existing federal efforts. Hooper warned that the promise of this technology is such that if America does not lead in developing it for the maritime arena, China will.
Taking this logic further, nuclear energy has a role to play in America’s civilian shipping sector as well. In a chapter of Returning From Ebb Tide: Renewing the United States Commercial Maritime Enterprise, experts Thomas Davies and Sanjana Shashikumar argue that building nuclear-powered vessels can help revive the American shipbuilding industry. “Advanced nuclear technology,” they write, “can be a transformative force, bolstering the U.S. merchant marine sector while strengthening national security and economic competitiveness.”
There is another way in which nuclear technology can help ensure America has a strong maritime sector. Expanding nuclear power in key locations can blunt an argument against a law that helps preserve America’s maritime industry for national security reasons. Passed in 1920—after World War I showed the U.S. how vulnerable its merchant fleet was—the Jones Act requires cargo going between any two U.S. ports to be transported on ships that are American-flagged, American-built, at least 75% American-owned, and at least 75% crewed by American citizens.
While the Jones Act supports around 650,000 jobs in the maritime industries, it also has a significant benefit for national security. It provides American merchant mariners with opportunities to hone their skills. It keeps them prepared in case of war, during which they will be essential—over 90% of military supplies and equipment are transported by ships, since aircraft generally are not large or strong enough.
In another chapter of Returning from Ebb Tide, CMS Non-Resident Senior Fellow John D. McCown Jr. analyzes the Jones Act’s effect on shipping costs. He concludes that only 9% of the cost of shipping between U.S. posts is due to the law’s requirements. Denying the Merchant Marine the ability to prepare for their contribution to a major war effort would drown out the small economic gain from repealing the Jones Act.
It is common for critics of the Jones Act to cite its effects on Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico. Separated geographically from the Continental United States, shipping products to these two states and one territory from CONUS is often costlier than shipping between two ports in the lower 48. Their remoteness also affects their mix of energy sources: they rely more heavily on petroleum for electricity than the lower 48. In 2024, for example, petroleum provided 62% of Puerto Rico’s electricity, and accounted for about 90% of Hawaii’s total energy consumption.
Nuclear energy can relieve these pressures. In Alaska, Eielson Air Force Base is set to host the first commercial microreactor used by the Armed Forces, a technology that could then be applied to the civilian economy. Although Hawaii’s constitution forbids the use of nuclear energy, it faces such an uphill battle in its push for non-fossil energy that some lawmakers want to reconsider this law and are calling for studies on the feasibility of nuclear reactors in their state. Nuclear is also a viable option for Puerto Rico, where support for it has grown in recent years.
Nuclear energy’s potential for maritime security affects both the sea services and communities on land. This technology is one that the U.S. should embrace for both its defense and economic benefits. It is a choice that would make Admiral Rickover proud.
Michael D. Purzycki is an analyst, writer, and editor based in Arlington, Virginia. He has worked for the United States Navy, Marine Corps, and Army.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.