China’s Mahanian Naval Strategy – And Why America Needs One Too
The MOC
By Lydia Miller
March 27, 2025
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Alfred Thayer Mahan, the father of American naval strategy, argued that maritime power is the key to national greatness. He argued that sea power expands beyond militarized naval power and instead lies at the nexus of commercial prowess and military capability. In today’s terms, this is benchmarked against the “trinity of wealth” categorized as economic growth, sustainable supply chains, and military power. Thus, in Mahan’s view, “command of the sea” in both peace and war is the ultimate guarantor of national security and prosperity. Yet today, the United States exhibits an ad hoc, reactive naval policy marked by budget-driven fleet cuts, shifting priorities, and complacent assumptions of U.S. dominance. The strategic vacuum in Washington stands in stark contrast to Beijing, which exhibits a comprehensive commercial and military understanding of sea power.
The transformation of China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) from a coastal defense force into a blue-water navy is no accident—it is the product of a deliberate, Mahanian strategy put in place over decades. China’s rapid economic rise has provided the resources necessary for such an aggressive naval buildup. Deeply intertwined with global commerce, China’s economy depends on secure maritime trade routes, and Beijing is acutely aware of its maritime vulnerabilities in critical choke points like the Strait of Malacca. At only 2.7 kilometers wide, the strait is highly susceptible to piracy as well as foreign control, making it a geopolitical Achilles’ heel for China. With over 80 percent of China’s oil imports and 60 percent of its annual trade passing through the strait, any disruption to these maritime trade routes would not only threaten China’s economic stability but also undermine the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) political legitimacy. Economic performance underpins the Party’s social contract with the Chinese people, hinging on its ability to deliver economic growth, stability, and national rejuvenation.
Any failure to safeguard these key strategic waterways risks destabilizing this delicate balance and undermining Xi Jinping’s vision of a strong, prosperous, and modern socialist nation. Xi Jinping has proclaimed: “History and experience tell us that a country will rise if it commands the oceans well and will fall if it surrenders them… We must adhere to a development path of becoming a rich and powerful state by making use of the sea.” As Mahan argued long ago, a strong merchant economy fuels the ability to build and sustain a formidable fleet. Beijing has heeded this lesson well, building the world’s foremost shipbuilding enterprise and merchant marine since the turn of the twenty-first century. China’s vast economic base not only gives Beijing the resources to build a powerful navy and commercial fleet, but it also creates the strategic imperative to protect their sea lines of communication (SLOCs) that bring trade to and from China. In Mahanian fashion, China’s leaders understand that wealth and sea power reinforce each other: secure the sea lanes fuel the economy and growing wealth furthers expand naval strength. This is why President Xi Jinping has explicitly linked China’s national rejuvenation to command of the seas.
The PLAN today is the world’s largest navy by number of ships, and it continues to expand at a staggering pace, a buildup “as much a statement of foreign policy intent as it is a plan to enhance naval capabilities.” China has shifted from merely defending its coasts to developing a diverse range of advanced platforms and weapon systems. Beyond platform acquisition, the modernization effort extends to improvements in maintenance and logistics, doctrine, personnel quality, education and training, and operational exercises, showcasing a holistic approach to building a world-class navy. Previously focused on conducting limited naval operations within regional waters, the PLAN transitioned to pursuing far more ambitious objectives aimed at achieving global operational capabilities. This shift is evident in the PLAN’s expanded focus on blue-water operations, the construction of larger and more capable ships, and the establishment of overseas bases to support sustained international deployments. This evolution marked a doctrinal shift from the “Offshore Defense” strategy, which emphasized coastal protection and asymmetric sea denial, to the more extensive “Open Seas Protection” doctrine introduced in 2015, prioritizing the defense of distant SLOCs in addition to regional dominance. This new approach reflected Beijing’s dual strategy of achieving regional superiority while addressing its dependence on global maritime routes. The scale and speed of China’s buildup underscores a clear objective: convert economic power into military maritime dominance.
The third pillar of China’s strategy is to build the capability to secure overseas SLOCs. China has moved aggressively to control or influence strategic maritime geography by building naval and air facilities on artificial islands squarely astride vital shipping lanes, especially in the South China Sea. These bases effectively extend China’s defensive perimeter and give it the means to threaten foreign vessels traversing this crossroads of global trade. Further west, China is expanding its presence into the Indian Ocean and beyond. It opened its first overseas naval base in Djibouti, at the mouth of the Red Sea, and has invested in ports from Gwadar in Pakistan to Hambantota in Sri Lanka. This string of port access agreements and bases positions the PLAN along the major routes connecting East Asia to the Middle East and Europe. This SLOC-centric strategy is pure Mahan: build a navy to secure one’s commerce as well as the ability to throttle an opponent’s commerce in wartime.
Taken together, these efforts show China executing a comprehensive Mahanian strategy. Beijing is harnessing its economic strength, building a first-rate navy, and extending control over vital sea lanes—all to fulfill Xi Jinping’s vision of China as a great maritime power. The effect is a self-reinforcing cycle of investment in pursuit of what Mahan described as the ultimate source of national power.
While China has embraced a clear, Mahanian vision, the United States has largely lost its way at sea. Despite its formidable capabilities, the U.S. Navy today is marked by a reactive posture and a fragmented strategic vision. Instead of crafting a unified strategy to secure global trade routes and command the seas, American naval policy has been shaped by shifting crises and short-term political priorities. The U.S. has been fighting the last war—focusing on carrier-based airstrikes against insurgents or on low-end littoral ships—while a new rival builds a fleet to win the next war. America’s maritime strategy documents have come and gone, full of buzzwords like “forward presence” and “global force for good,” but lacking the singular clarity of purpose that a Mahanian strategy demands. The Navy’s force structure has accordingly remained in flux: shrinking in overall size, canceling robust shipbuilding programs, and then scrambling to catch up as China surges ahead. This whiplash betrays an underlying truth: the United States has not treated sea power as the central pillar of national security in the way Mahan prescribed. This drift away from Mahan’s principles means that the United States risks being outmaneuvered by an adversary that thinks and acts strategically about control of the oceans as an end in itself and not just a means to project power ashore.
Perhaps most strikingly, Mahan’s ideas have fallen from favor in U.S. naval thought. Once required reading for generations of officers, his work is now rarely invoked in strategy debates. While Mahan is read in China, his writings have been dropped from the U.S. Navy’s own reading list, making him “a prophet not honored by his own country’s navy”. U.S. analysts warn that if Beijing succeeds in its maritime ambitions, the world could see the erosion of the free, rules-based order on the high seas—replaced by an era of might-makes-right. These are the stakes of ceding command of the sea. And yet, despite this clear and present danger, the American response so far has been halting and uncoordinated—a patchwork of initiatives rather than a true strategy to achieve maritime renaissance.
To counter China’s assertive maritime strategy, the United States must reclaim a true Mahanian approach—a comprehensive maritime grand strategy built on sea control, deterrence, and commerce protection. This requires several bold shifts in U.S. policy and priorities:
America must reinvest in its fleet to regain both qualitative and quantitative advantages at sea. This means expanding the number of high-end warships and integrating next-generation technologies. A larger, modernized Navy capable of decisively winning and holding sea control is essential for deterring adversaries. The goal should be a fleet that can win and hold sea control in any theater. As Mahan argued, the surest way to prevent war is to be so well-prepared that no rival believes it could win.
A renewed American maritime strategy must refocus on the Navy’s historic role of safeguarding trade routes and the global commons. Thus, a Mahanian U.S. strategy would prioritize missions like securing major chokepoints (the Panama Canal, Suez, Malacca, Hormuz, etc.), patrolling shipping lanes against threats (be they piracy or coercion by state actors), and ensuring that no hostile power can choke off the sea lanes that connect America to its markets and allies. It should also invest in resilient logistics and repair facilities around the world so that the fleet can operate forward for extended periods. In essence, Washington must remember that the Navy exists not just to fight and win wars, but to enable global trade and prevent war by keeping the peace on the seas.
A modern Mahanian strategy demands a robust network of forward bases and deep alliances. Here, the U.S. Navy enjoys a substantial head start over the PLAN. The United States should accelerate efforts to secure basing rights and develop new logistical hubs in strategic regions such as the Indo-Pacific. Recent moves in this direction—such as U.S. agreements for access to additional bases in the Philippines, or plans to invest in port facilities from Australia to India—are welcome and should be built upon. Moreover, the United States should leverage its alliances with other maritime nations to create a collective Mahanian strategy.
Finally, America needs a renaissance of strategic thinking and public advocacy for sea power. A Mahanian strategy is not just about assets, it is about mindset. U.S. leaders—civilian and military—must articulate why dominating the seas is vital for America’s security and prosperity in this century, just as it was in the last. This means crafting a lucid maritime strategy document that goes beyond buzzwords to lay out clear ends, ways, and means. The United States will not implement a Mahanian strategy by default—it requires political will to explain that leadership on the waves is irreplaceable if we wish to avoid catastrophe and war. In doing so, they can restore Mahan’s principles to their rightful place in U.S. grand strategy.
China’s naval modernization is no accident—it is the result of a deliberate, Mahanian strategy that converts economic might into maritime dominance. Beijing’s methodical approach to securing trade routes, building a modern fleet, and extending its strategic reach stands in stark contrast to America’s fragmented and reactive posture. The stakes are clear: if the United States fails to reclaim its focus on sea power, it risks ceding its historic role as the guardian of the global maritime order. In the new era of great-power competition, the command of the seas is not merely a military objective; it is the foundation of national power and global stability. The United States must remember that, as Mahan taught, great nations must not only float with the tide of history—they must command the waves.
Lydia Miller is a student at George Washington University and a Nimitz Intern at the Center for Maritime Strategy.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.