Part Two
Part of the answer to Dr. Martin’s question on priorities and fulfillment of requirements comes next in chapter 7 by William McDonald, entitled, “The Maritime Security Program and the Tanker Security Program: Force Multipliers for U.S. Sealift.” William McDonald is director of Sealift Support for the U.S. Department of Transportation Maritime Administration. A 14-year veteran of MARAD, he has more than 20 years of experience in maritime affairs, including sealift support for U.S. force deployment and sustainment, port and intermodal development, U.S.-flag deep draft vessel operations, and coastal and inland waterways transportation. In his present post, McDonald oversees the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement and the Maritime Security Program (MSP) under which U.S.-flag ocean carriers commit vessels and intermodal capacity to meet U.S. Department of Defense sealift requirements in times of war or another national emergency.
To supplement our U.S.-flagged merchant fleet in time of need, MSP retains a fleet of 60 ships, which are actively conducting business worldwide and therefore ready to meet Department of Defense requirements. Each of these ships is on an annual retainer of $5.3 million. About one-half of the MSP fleet are container ships and the other half are roll-on, roll-off (RORO) or heavy lift platforms. MSP not only augments our ability to respond to crisis, but it also employs 2,400 merchant Mariners at a time when we are losing this group of critically skilled individuals due to lack of work. MSP proved its worth during 20 years of war in Afghanistan by transporting billions of dollars in supplies through the northern and southern defense networks.
The Tanker Security Program (TSP) is intended to meet the refueling needs of ground forces, air forces, and the combat fleet at times of heightened tension. The TSP is capped at 10 ships, and when combined with the existing inventory of 50 U.S.-flagged tankers, falls well short of requirements that could exceed 86 tankers needed to support a conflict. Furthermore, what some do not understand is that the TSP is not plug-and-play in the fleet. TSP ships cannot refuel an aircraft carrier or an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer. TSP ships are configured with consolidated replenishment stations (a.k.a. console) that allow a TSP ship to pass fuel to a combat logistics force ship and from there to fleet combatants. It is not an elegant solution, but it moves petroleum oil lubricants forward from defense fuel support points and into the fight.
While MSP and TSP offer some relief to the issue of sealift and refueling capacity, our numbers today pale in comparison to the 1960s when the U.S. boasted 700 U.S.-flagged ships—or the 200 ships we mustered during Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Some have proposed that Congress double the MSP and TSP programs to 120 and 20 ships, respectively. While I fully support the increase in numbers, it is uncertain where the money would come from to do so.
There is support in Congress as evidenced by the recent congressional report, Congressional Guidance for a National Maritime Strategy: Reversing the Decline of America’s Maritime Power, signed by Senator Mark Kelly (D-AZ) and former senator Marco Rubio (R-FL) and former congressman Mike Waltz (R-FL) and Congressman John Garamendi (D-CA). Most importantly, these legislators advocate for a national maritime strategy to address the concerns raised in this book and find solutions in collaboration with a public-private partnership.
In chapter 8, Sabreena Croteau provides a more in-depth analysis in her chapter, “The National Defense Reserve Fleet, the Ready Reserve Force, and Prepositioning Programs.” The Ready Reserve Force (RRF) is currently comprised of 46 vessels that include 35 RORO ships, six auxiliary crane ships, two heavy-lift platforms, two aviation repair ships, and one Offshore Petroleum Discharge System (OPDS) tanker. As previously discussed, these ships are required to be ready to deploy within 5–10 days. Accordingly, they are crewed by about 450 Mariners who would need to be augmented with a surge force of Mariners in the event of activation. The RRF has a poor history of readiness during turbo activations. Despite that fact, some have suggested extending the service life of some of these platforms out to 60 years as they have been maintained pier-side for most of their service lives, accruing less wear and tear on the hull and machinery than if they had been underway. This seems like a desperation measure and is characteristic of the decline of the U.S. commercial shipping industry. In response to the shortage of new and affordable hulls, the Navy has experimented with a Common Hull Auxiliary Multimission Platform (CHAMP), but it has been determined that trying to gain efficiencies by designing one hull as a RORO ship, a container ship, a bulk carrier, or a tanker, is incongruent with the particular design needs of each class of ship. In an effort to produce new ships for training that provide a place for future classes of merchant Mariners, MARAD has funded a five-ship class of national security multimission vessels at a price of $380 million each from the Philadelphia shipyard. Unfortunately, engineering problems plagued the maiden voyage of the first ship of the class.
The final section of the book, “The Merchant Marine,” offers Captain John Konrad V’s presentation of an “Introduction to the Merchant Marine” in chapter 9.
Captain Konrad is one of the most fervent advocates of a strong U.S. Merchant Marine that I know. He is a proud alumnus of the New York Maritime College, a bestselling author, entrepreneur, and a U.S. Merchant Marine officer. He is one of a diminishing few American Mariners who holds a “United States Master of Vessels any gross tons, upon ocean” (Master Unlimited) license. In 2006, Konrad founded gCaptain, one of the world’s most popular maritime news websites, with a record-breaking 2 million monthly page views. Furthermore, he is not only a Master Unlimited but also a former shipbuilder and shipyard operations manager. One immediately senses his passion for the trade in the opening paragraph of this chapter:
The story of America’s maritime history is not just about ships and sailors; it is a tale of ambition, innovation, and the relentless pursuit of opportunity. Deep dive into the annals of our nation’s past, and you will find that free trade and American enterprise are the twin currents that propelled the United States to its position as a global maritime powerhouse.
Konrad immediately reminds us that the American Revolution was not won solely in land battles but also at sea due to the courage of privateers like merchant captain John Paul Jones, who is now revered as the father of the U.S. Navy and buried in the crypt under the Cathedral of the Navy at the Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland. Following the American Revolution, Yankee traders sailed the world and stimulated commerce between our “island nation” and distant places on the globe. The age of steam would have a profound impact on the sea lines of communication as it would on the nation’s infrastructure and rail lines of communication joining the East and West Coasts of the United States. Alfred Thayer Mahan would underscore the importance of a strong Navy and Merchant Marine to protect sea lines of communication and preserve the American economy through trade in his landmark work The Influence of Sea Power upon History. The era of Woodrow Wilson’s administration from 1913 to 1921 and the impact of America’s entry into World War I changed America from an isolationist nation to one inextricably involved in global affairs. A series of congressionally mandated Merchant Marine Acts (1916, 1920, and 1928) including the Jones Act followed, providing a Maritime Shipping Board (precursor to MARAD), financial resources, and legislation to preserve the commercial maritime industry in perpetuity. Thankfully, this legislative trend continued with the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, which enabled subsidies for ship construction, emphasized a dual use doctrine (preserving commercial maritime capability in time of war), and alleviated labor concerns. The importance of this legislation cannot be understated as it provided the foundation for the “arsenal of democracy” that instantiated itself in America during World War II and produced the Liberty ships and convoys that contributed directly to the defeat of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan.
Since the end of World War II, many more changes occurred that have contributed to the decline of the American commercial shipping enterprise to include the end of the Cold War, containerization, globalization, and the arrival of “Flags of Convenience,” against which the U.S. commercial maritime industry cannot effectively compete. Konrad’s fear is that the massive lift of personnel, equipment, and supplies that characterized the Gulf Wars may have been the last hurrah for the U.S. Merchant Marine and our commercial maritime industry. As China has risen, it realized the importance of commercial maritime power, and it has subsidized production of its massive commercial fleet protected by its growing navy. While China expands its influence in the maritime domain, America lags further behind. Konrad concludes with a stark warning:
The U.S. Merchant Marine often finds itself overshadowed, largely forgotten by all the military branches except the U.S. Coast Guard. The absence is palpable, especially when our nation’s leaders routinely extend gratitude to veterans from every other Service, leaving the Merchant Marines conspicuously absent from even the most basic acknowledgments. The question remains: How long can dedication persist in the shadow of abject neglect and near universal apathy toward the U. S. Merchant Marine?
In light of John Konrad’s sobering examination of the state of the U.S. Merchant Marine today, it is important to ensure that the Merchant Marine is capable of manning our U.S. commercial maritime fleet in peacetime and wartime. Our maritime academies fulfill an important role and Dr. Christopher Chiego, Dr. Amy Skoll, and Dr. Ryan Wade of California State Maritime University illustrate this in chapter 10, “The Maritime Academies and Maritime Training.” The need for civilian mariner trainers manifested in the latter nineteenth century as the U.S. industrial base was undergoing a revolution. Despite the need for civilian Mariners articulated in this and the last chapter during World Wars I and II, attempts to delimit or close the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy and state-run institutions took place many times during the twentieth century. To ward off future attempts to do so, maritime academies were integrated into state university systems.
Today, training and certification of Mariners for our merchant fleet is provided by seven institutions of maritime higher education: The U.S. Merchant Marine Academy, California State University Maritime Academy, Texas A&M University Maritime Academy, Massachusetts Maritime Academy, Maine Maritime Academy, State University of New York Maritime College, and Great Lakes Maritime Academy. After completion of the curriculum and U.S. Coast Guard certification, officers receive a bachelor’s degree and a license as a third mate or third assistant engineer. This is a capability that we must both preserve and expand for the benefit of the nation. In fact, the U.S. Merchant Marine is currently short more than 1,800 Mariners. Training opportunities are shrinking on U.S.-flagged commercial vessels. To alleviate this, MARAD commissioned five national security multimission vessels that will enhance training opportunities for American Mariners and serve as dual-use platforms in time of war. Two of the five ships have been completed. The first has been delivered to California State Maritime Academy and the second is earmarked for the Massachusetts Maritime Academy.
Despite MARAD’s best efforts, interest in and applications to maritime academies have dropped during the last few years. The industry has also been plagued by serious incidences of sexual harassment and assault, culminating in MARAD’s launch of the “Every Mariner Builds a Respectful Culture” or EMBARC program in 2021. Failure to create a safe and secure work environment for women will lead to further declines in the pool of eligible Mariners in the future workforce.
Our maritime academies offer tremendous opportunities to America’s youth with the promise of a bachelor’s degree, licensed practical skills, and a fulfilling and rewarding job and career. Policy makers must continue to fund these programs and look for avenues to enhance recruitment and retention in the industry.
This brings me to chapter 11, by Geoffrey Brown in collaboration with Lieutenant Commander Eric Bardot, “Mariner Retention: Decades of Neglect.” Brown and Bardot start with the essence of the problem:
The current state of the U.S. Marchant Marine presents a national security problem: the labor force is demonstrably so tight that risks of ship delays in a conflict are a real hazard.
The bottom line is that the inventory of U.S. Mariners is directly linked to available billets on U.S.-flagged merchant ships and with the decline of the Merchant Marine during the last two decades, the labor force has followed with a precipitous drop in numbers. This applies to both officer and ratings; the former having seen a decline of 27 percent and the latter 78 percent in the period between 2001 and 2017. Furthermore, determining the inventory of active and inactive Mariners in the United States is somewhat challenging. Active Mariners must have current accreditation and have sailed on an oceangoing vessel in the last 18 months. Inactive Mariners would require some finite period of time to recertify. There is also a distinction in addition to the category of active and inactive Mariners, and that is the mariner who is in an active status, but unable to get underway due to another commitment or simply unwilling to do so. This creates a statistical problem for MARAD in determining how many Mariners will actually be ready to sail in a crisis or in wartime. To solve this crisis, in partnership with the labor unions, MARAD needs a comprehensive recruitment program to boost the numbers of qualified officers and ratings willing to go to sea. The worse recruitment becomes, the harder it will be to obtain volunteers as quality of service will suffer with longer time at sea, longer hours while underway, and less time off between deployments. Recently, the Transportation Institute has proposed a solution to the problem of mariner inventory in the form of Operation Mariner. The four working groups of Operation Mariner address wages and benefits, quality of life, marketing and outreach, and regulatory barriers. Brown and Bardot provide more details in the chapter, but suffice it to say that Operation Mariner is a good start on addressing the critical shortage of merchant Mariners in America and should be fully supported by labor unions, policy makers, legislators, and shippers. Doing anything less will contribute to future unreadiness of our merchant marine and have grave consequences for U.S. national security.
America is an island nation almost wholly dependent on seaborne commerce to sustain its robust economy. While the U.S. Navy preserves and protects our sea lines of communication, merchant ships move fuel, bulk supplies, and containers to and from our seaports of arrival or departure. Any restrictions on this continuous flow of commerce would have dire consequences for our economy, our way of life, and the health and welfare of our citizenry. For a variety of reasons, we have allowed the American merchant fleet to atrophy during the last few decades. Outsourcing to cheaper and less strident foreign competition has not only reduced the U.S.-flagged fleet’s ability to compete but also diminished its numbers in terms of merchant ships and Mariners to staff them. This is a very precarious situation, especially in time of heightened tensions or war, and it must be reversed. Were the United States to find itself in a full-blown conflict overseas today, we would simply not have enough capacity in our merchant fleet to sustain the fight. This is not, however, a lost cause. There are many good ideas in this edited volume on how to reverse this process and make America’s merchant fleet a leader once again, including exploration of multimodalism; revitalizing and rebuilding the Ready Reserve Fleet; exploring new and efficient methods of propulsion; increasing training opportunities for merchant Mariners and increasing the size of our state and federal merchant marine academies; and providing subsidies when and where necessary to give the competitive advantage back to American shipping. All this and more will require a holistic effort on the part of the maritime Services, shipping companies, shipbuilders, and our policy makers. It will also require resources necessary to rebuild a force that we all can be proud of. Let the revolution in American merchant shipping start right here.