An aerial view of the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., May 15, 2023. (DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Staff Sgt. John Wright)
By Matthew Reisener
December 10, 2025
On December 4, 2025, the White House released its National Security Strategy (NSS) outlining the Trump administration’s view of the most pressing national security challenges facing the United States and its plans to address them. The 29-page strategy is unmistakably infused with and reflective of President Trump’s worldview, to the point where one’s opinion of its veracity probably corresponds with their view of the President and his “Make America Great Again” project. However, both proponents and detractors of this strategy can likely agree that it represents a significant departure from the modern orthodoxy of American security policy—for better or worse.
President Trump’s new NSS is, in many ways, America’s first avowedly post-primacy strategy. While previous national security strategies spoke of shaping the world in America’s image and strengthening the post-Cold War global order, this strategy declares that “The days of the United States propping up the entire world order like Atlas are over,” while criticizing the country’s past pursuit of “permanent American domination of the entire world,” at the expense of prioritizing America’s “core national interests.” Such interests include both traditional American goals such as domestic prosperity, military prowess, and nuclear deterrence, as well as aspirations such as “the restoration and reinvigoration of American spiritual and cultural health,” which are not traditionally thought of as matters of national security.
While President Biden’s NSS called for the preservation of the liberal international order and featured calls to “strengthen democracy around the world,” this strategy criticizes what the Trump administration views as “sovereignty-sapping incursions of the most intrusive transnational organizations,” while making no mention of democracy promotion. Trump’s strategy elevates protectionism and economic nationalism to the status of national security concerns, touting the abandonment of “globalism and so-called ‘free trade,’” and declaring “an end to “free-riding, trade imbalances, predatory economic practices, and other impositions on our nation’s historic goodwill that disadvantage our interests.” Though not an embrace of isolationism, the NSS certainly signals America’s de-prioritization of the rules-based international order and an acknowledgement that America’s “unipolar moment,” if it ever truly existed, is over.
That President Trump’s NSS would deviate significantly from his predecessor’s is no surprise; that Trump’s 2025 strategy would diverge so sharply from the strategies produced during his first term is. President Trump’s 2017 NSS and 2018 National Defense Strategy focused heavily on preparing America to successfully navigate great power competition and deter conflict with revisionist powers, with the latter document declaring that “Long-term strategic competitions with China and Russia are the principal priorities,” for America’s national defense. By contrast, the new strategy promotes the Western Hemisphere as America’s primary strategic priority, arguing for “a readjustment of our global military presence to address urgent threats in our Hemisphere.”
Unlike President Trump’s 2017 strategy, the latest document primarily emphasizes the importance of competing with China in the Asia-Pacific in the economic rather than the military and defense realms. The 2025 strategy discusses Russia not in terms of its capacity to “challenge American power, influence, and interests” as the 2017 document did, but in the context of needing to end the Russo-Ukrainian War and promote “strategic stability” with Russia. While North Korea and Iran were significant fixtures in the 2017 NSS, the former is not mentioned at all in the 2025 document, while the latter is only discussed in the context of its defeat in the Twelve-Day War. Terrorism, which was mentioned 82 times in the 2017 strategy, merits only five mentions in the current iteration. These stark differences reflect the extent to which President Trump’s decision to surround himself with like-minded advisors in his second term rather than “establishment” foreign policy and defense thinkers continues to shape his unorthodox approach to national security.
One of the most notable elements of the NSS is its promotion of the so-called “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, which asserts America’s willingness to oppose “hostile foreign incursion or ownership of key assets” in Latin America, as well as discourage mass migration and transnational crime in the region. This corollary seeks to update the Monroe Doctrine for the 21st century, building on the 1823 declaration that America would view intervention by foreign powers into the political affairs of the Americas as a hostile act against the United States. It also builds on the 1904 “Roosevelt Corollary,” which asserted America’s willingness to act as an international police power in the Western Hemisphere, including intervening in the domestic affairs of Latin American countries when necessary.
The inclusion of this eponymous declaration not only reflects President Trump’s concern with the growing influence of countries such as China in Latin America, but also his elevation of issues such as immigration and counter-narcotics, traditionally viewed primarily through the lens of law enforcement, as critical national security issues. Indeed, the strategy’s call for “targeted deployments to secure the border and defeat cartels, including where necessary the use of lethal force,” suggests that military operations to secure America’s southern border and target suspected drug smuggling operations could become increasingly common during Trump’s second term.
By fixing America’s attention on the Western hemisphere, the 2025 NSS at least partly reverses the prioritization of the Asia-Pacific envisioned by Trump’s first national security and defense strategies. While the 2017 NSS emphasized the threat posed by Chinese efforts to “displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, expand the reaches of its state-driven economic model, and reorder the region in its favor,” the 2025 strategy is primarily concerned with achieving a more favorable Sino-American trade balance and the failure of the rules-based international order to prevent China’s adoption of unfair trade practices. Unlike President Trump’s first-term strategies which cast China as America’s primary geopolitical adversary, this strategy hints at Trump’s potential ambitions for a “grand bargain” with China on trade and geopolitical issues. The strategy posits that America’s “ultimate goal is to lay the foundation for long-term economic vitality,” which is achieved not only through “a robust and ongoing focus on deterrence to prevent war in the Indo-Pacific,” but also through “maintaining a genuinely mutually advantageous economic relationship with Beijing.” Even the strategy’s discussion of Taiwan marks a slight departure from past rhetoric on this issue. While the strategy cites deterring conflict over Taiwan as a priority, its statement that America “does not support any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait” marks a subtle shift from previous language “opposing” such changes—a decidedly minor, yet important distinction which could signal diminishing American commitment to Taiwan’s de facto independence.
However, arguably the most surprising element of the NSS is its approach to Europe and its elevation of the US as the defender of a “Western identity.” Claiming that long-term security is impossible without robust spiritual and cultural health, the strategy argues that America must cherish “its past glories and its heroes” and promote “growing numbers of strong, traditional families.” By contrast, the strategy contends that Europe’s inability and unwillingness to do so has led to cultural decay and put the continent at risk of “civilizational erasure.”
To the Trump administration, Europe’s declining percentage of global GDP, relatively low defense spending, commitment to transnational bodies such as the European Union, and changing demographics resulting from increased migration and “cratering birthrates,” call into question “whether certain European countries will have economies and militaries strong enough to remain reliable allies.” The strategy frames European concerns with Russia as being symptomatic of Europe’s weakness and stemming from a “lack of self-confidence”—a far cry from the 2017 strategy’s warning that “revisionist” Russia was “using subversive measures to weaken the credibility of America’s commitment to Europe, undermine transatlantic unity, and weaken European institutions and governments.” Trump’s belief in the need to promote “European Greatness,” combined with his elevation of domestic cultural issues to the level of national security, belies his vision of America as the vanguard of a shared Western cultural identity and his uncertainty regarding the ability of America’s European allies to help preserve it.
One thing that is certain is the extent to which the NSS reflects the function of American seapower in preserving national security. The strategy outlines an explicit role for the sea services in powering Trump’s pivot towards the Western hemisphere, calling for “a more suitable Coast Guard and Navy presence to control sea lanes, to thwart illegal and other unwanted migration, to reduce human and drug trafficking, and to control key transit routes in a crisis.” The strategy identifies “preserving freedom of navigation in all crucial sea lanes, and maintaining secure and reliable supply chains and access to critical materials” as key foreign policy interests, underscoring the importance of one of the US Navy’s most essential functions. While the strategy decidedly deemphasizes American involvement in the Middle East, it nevertheless highlights the importance of preventing “an adversarial power from dominating the Middle East, its oil and gas supplies, and the chokepoints through which they pass,” suggesting a continuation of the Navy’s efforts to ensure the free flow of commerce through bodies such as the Red Sea and Persian Gulf.
Finally, the strategy’s emphasis on revitalizing domestic manufacturing as a national security issue and “the highest priority of national economic policy” hints at the administration’s interest in reinvigorating America’s shipbuilding industry. The strategy calls for a “national mobilization to innovate powerful defenses at low cost, to produce the most capable and modern systems and munitions at scale, and to re-shore our defense industrial supply chains.” Trump’s April 9 executive order on “Restoring America’s Maritime Dominance” mandated the creation of a “Maritime Action Plan” to prescribe policy solutions to addressing the challenges facing American shipbuilders. Once publicly released, this strategy could indicate the true extent of the administration’s commitment to treating the reinvigoration of American shipbuilding as a national security priority.
America’s new NSS charts a radical new course for American efforts to preserve national security. Whether the White House’s decision to diverge far from establishment thinking proves sound, and whether the Trump administration succeeds in implementing the tenants of this strategy, will likely have significant ramifications for the future of American national security and maritime power.
Matthew Reisener is the Senior National Security Advisor at the Center for Maritime Strategy.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.
By Matthew Reisener
On December 4, 2025, the White House released its National Security Strategy (NSS) outlining the Trump administration’s view of the most pressing national security challenges facing the United States and its plans to address them. The 29-page strategy is unmistakably infused with and reflective of President Trump’s worldview, to the point where one’s opinion of its veracity probably corresponds with their view of the President and his “Make America Great Again” project. However, both proponents and detractors of this strategy can likely agree that it represents a significant departure from the modern orthodoxy of American security policy—for better or worse.
President Trump’s new NSS is, in many ways, America’s first avowedly post-primacy strategy. While previous national security strategies spoke of shaping the world in America’s image and strengthening the post-Cold War global order, this strategy declares that “The days of the United States propping up the entire world order like Atlas are over,” while criticizing the country’s past pursuit of “permanent American domination of the entire world,” at the expense of prioritizing America’s “core national interests.” Such interests include both traditional American goals such as domestic prosperity, military prowess, and nuclear deterrence, as well as aspirations such as “the restoration and reinvigoration of American spiritual and cultural health,” which are not traditionally thought of as matters of national security.
While President Biden’s NSS called for the preservation of the liberal international order and featured calls to “strengthen democracy around the world,” this strategy criticizes what the Trump administration views as “sovereignty-sapping incursions of the most intrusive transnational organizations,” while making no mention of democracy promotion. Trump’s strategy elevates protectionism and economic nationalism to the status of national security concerns, touting the abandonment of “globalism and so-called ‘free trade,’” and declaring “an end to “free-riding, trade imbalances, predatory economic practices, and other impositions on our nation’s historic goodwill that disadvantage our interests.” Though not an embrace of isolationism, the NSS certainly signals America’s de-prioritization of the rules-based international order and an acknowledgement that America’s “unipolar moment,” if it ever truly existed, is over.
That President Trump’s NSS would deviate significantly from his predecessor’s is no surprise; that Trump’s 2025 strategy would diverge so sharply from the strategies produced during his first term is. President Trump’s 2017 NSS and 2018 National Defense Strategy focused heavily on preparing America to successfully navigate great power competition and deter conflict with revisionist powers, with the latter document declaring that “Long-term strategic competitions with China and Russia are the principal priorities,” for America’s national defense. By contrast, the new strategy promotes the Western Hemisphere as America’s primary strategic priority, arguing for “a readjustment of our global military presence to address urgent threats in our Hemisphere.”
Unlike President Trump’s 2017 strategy, the latest document primarily emphasizes the importance of competing with China in the Asia-Pacific in the economic rather than the military and defense realms. The 2025 strategy discusses Russia not in terms of its capacity to “challenge American power, influence, and interests” as the 2017 document did, but in the context of needing to end the Russo-Ukrainian War and promote “strategic stability” with Russia. While North Korea and Iran were significant fixtures in the 2017 NSS, the former is not mentioned at all in the 2025 document, while the latter is only discussed in the context of its defeat in the Twelve-Day War. Terrorism, which was mentioned 82 times in the 2017 strategy, merits only five mentions in the current iteration. These stark differences reflect the extent to which President Trump’s decision to surround himself with like-minded advisors in his second term rather than “establishment” foreign policy and defense thinkers continues to shape his unorthodox approach to national security.
One of the most notable elements of the NSS is its promotion of the so-called “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, which asserts America’s willingness to oppose “hostile foreign incursion or ownership of key assets” in Latin America, as well as discourage mass migration and transnational crime in the region. This corollary seeks to update the Monroe Doctrine for the 21st century, building on the 1823 declaration that America would view intervention by foreign powers into the political affairs of the Americas as a hostile act against the United States. It also builds on the 1904 “Roosevelt Corollary,” which asserted America’s willingness to act as an international police power in the Western Hemisphere, including intervening in the domestic affairs of Latin American countries when necessary.
The inclusion of this eponymous declaration not only reflects President Trump’s concern with the growing influence of countries such as China in Latin America, but also his elevation of issues such as immigration and counter-narcotics, traditionally viewed primarily through the lens of law enforcement, as critical national security issues. Indeed, the strategy’s call for “targeted deployments to secure the border and defeat cartels, including where necessary the use of lethal force,” suggests that military operations to secure America’s southern border and target suspected drug smuggling operations could become increasingly common during Trump’s second term.
By fixing America’s attention on the Western hemisphere, the 2025 NSS at least partly reverses the prioritization of the Asia-Pacific envisioned by Trump’s first national security and defense strategies. While the 2017 NSS emphasized the threat posed by Chinese efforts to “displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, expand the reaches of its state-driven economic model, and reorder the region in its favor,” the 2025 strategy is primarily concerned with achieving a more favorable Sino-American trade balance and the failure of the rules-based international order to prevent China’s adoption of unfair trade practices. Unlike President Trump’s first-term strategies which cast China as America’s primary geopolitical adversary, this strategy hints at Trump’s potential ambitions for a “grand bargain” with China on trade and geopolitical issues. The strategy posits that America’s “ultimate goal is to lay the foundation for long-term economic vitality,” which is achieved not only through “a robust and ongoing focus on deterrence to prevent war in the Indo-Pacific,” but also through “maintaining a genuinely mutually advantageous economic relationship with Beijing.” Even the strategy’s discussion of Taiwan marks a slight departure from past rhetoric on this issue. While the strategy cites deterring conflict over Taiwan as a priority, its statement that America “does not support any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait” marks a subtle shift from previous language “opposing” such changes—a decidedly minor, yet important distinction which could signal diminishing American commitment to Taiwan’s de facto independence.
However, arguably the most surprising element of the NSS is its approach to Europe and its elevation of the US as the defender of a “Western identity.” Claiming that long-term security is impossible without robust spiritual and cultural health, the strategy argues that America must cherish “its past glories and its heroes” and promote “growing numbers of strong, traditional families.” By contrast, the strategy contends that Europe’s inability and unwillingness to do so has led to cultural decay and put the continent at risk of “civilizational erasure.”
To the Trump administration, Europe’s declining percentage of global GDP, relatively low defense spending, commitment to transnational bodies such as the European Union, and changing demographics resulting from increased migration and “cratering birthrates,” call into question “whether certain European countries will have economies and militaries strong enough to remain reliable allies.” The strategy frames European concerns with Russia as being symptomatic of Europe’s weakness and stemming from a “lack of self-confidence”—a far cry from the 2017 strategy’s warning that “revisionist” Russia was “using subversive measures to weaken the credibility of America’s commitment to Europe, undermine transatlantic unity, and weaken European institutions and governments.” Trump’s belief in the need to promote “European Greatness,” combined with his elevation of domestic cultural issues to the level of national security, belies his vision of America as the vanguard of a shared Western cultural identity and his uncertainty regarding the ability of America’s European allies to help preserve it.
One thing that is certain is the extent to which the NSS reflects the function of American seapower in preserving national security. The strategy outlines an explicit role for the sea services in powering Trump’s pivot towards the Western hemisphere, calling for “a more suitable Coast Guard and Navy presence to control sea lanes, to thwart illegal and other unwanted migration, to reduce human and drug trafficking, and to control key transit routes in a crisis.” The strategy identifies “preserving freedom of navigation in all crucial sea lanes, and maintaining secure and reliable supply chains and access to critical materials” as key foreign policy interests, underscoring the importance of one of the US Navy’s most essential functions. While the strategy decidedly deemphasizes American involvement in the Middle East, it nevertheless highlights the importance of preventing “an adversarial power from dominating the Middle East, its oil and gas supplies, and the chokepoints through which they pass,” suggesting a continuation of the Navy’s efforts to ensure the free flow of commerce through bodies such as the Red Sea and Persian Gulf.
Finally, the strategy’s emphasis on revitalizing domestic manufacturing as a national security issue and “the highest priority of national economic policy” hints at the administration’s interest in reinvigorating America’s shipbuilding industry. The strategy calls for a “national mobilization to innovate powerful defenses at low cost, to produce the most capable and modern systems and munitions at scale, and to re-shore our defense industrial supply chains.” Trump’s April 9 executive order on “Restoring America’s Maritime Dominance” mandated the creation of a “Maritime Action Plan” to prescribe policy solutions to addressing the challenges facing American shipbuilders. Once publicly released, this strategy could indicate the true extent of the administration’s commitment to treating the reinvigoration of American shipbuilding as a national security priority.
America’s new NSS charts a radical new course for American efforts to preserve national security. Whether the White House’s decision to diverge far from establishment thinking proves sound, and whether the Trump administration succeeds in implementing the tenants of this strategy, will likely have significant ramifications for the future of American national security and maritime power.
Matthew Reisener is the Senior National Security Advisor at the Center for Maritime Strategy.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.