A few days before President Trump’s planned meeting with China’s Xi Jinping in Seoul, Trump provided an insightful glimpse into his views on a topic that is likely to come up during this meeting: Taiwan. Asked whether he believed the American/British/Australian security alliance presents an effective deterrent against potential Chinese aggression towards Taiwan, Trump responded:
“Yeah, I do. I think it is, but I don’t think we’re going to need it. I think we’ll be just fine with China. China doesn’t want to do that. First of all, the United States is the strongest military power in the world by far, it’s not even close, not even close. We have the best equipment, we have the best of everything, and nobody’s going to mess with that. And I don’t see that at all with President Xi, I think we’re going to get along very well as it pertains to Taiwan and others. Now, that doesn’t mean it’s not the apple of his eye, because probably it is, but I don’t see anything happening. We have a very good trade relationship, we’re going to have a very good… I think when we leave South Korea, I could be wrong, but I think we’ll end up with a very strong trade deal, both of us will be happy. I don’t see that happening, no.”
As this quote indicates, Trump believes it is extremely unlikely that China will invade Taiwan and is confident in America’s ability to deter them, particularly if the US can sign a new trade deal with China. The quote is also supported by Trump’s previous claim that Xi personally promised not to try to conquer Taiwan while Trump is president. Taken in concert, these statements are consistent with Trump’s tendency to tether his perception of global affairs to his personal relationships with foreign leaders, as well as his belief that his administration can cut deals with other countries that encourage them to align their foreign policy with American interests.
But prospects for a sweeping US-China trade agreement aside, is Trump correct to think that China is unlikely to attack Taiwan? Probably in the short term—but the answer is considerably more complicated.
First, Trump is hardly alone in his skepticism of an imminent attack; in a recent survey of regional experts conducted by Defense Priorities, nearly 85% of respondents classified the prospect of such an invasion in the next five years as either “Unlikely” or “Very Unlikely.” While Xi’s desire to reach a détente on the US-China trade war may factor into this assessment, there are also several logistical realities that make invading Taiwan a challenging proposition. Such a campaign would require China to ferry hundreds of thousands of troops across roughly 100 miles of ocean, necessitating a massive and complex landing operation that would put D-Day to shame. Taiwan’s coastline has been assessed by naval experts as being “remarkably unsuited for amphibious operations,” with its eastern shore blanketed by steep cliffs and its western shore beset by shallow waters which would prevent larger Chinese ships from anchoring. Chinese transport vessels would be vulnerable to attack from Taiwan and any allied supporters during transit and while unloading troops, and the few beaches suitable for landing would be heavily defended. Even if China succeeded in capturing Taiwan’s major population centers, the PLA would likely face sustained insurgency campaigns both in cities and in the mountains, as the strong sense of nationalism among the Taiwanese people would invariably produce a steadfast resistance that would be costly and time-intensive for China to crush.
Victory over Taiwan would not be easy and, given the significant economic and reputational costs associated with such a campaign, China is unlikely to start this war unless it is positive it can win. Given the option, China would strongly prefer a political pathway towards unification or to continue its efforts to develop a strong enough conventional military that it can push Taiwan to the negotiating table through the credible threat of a looming invasion.
Yet while China may struggle to subdue Taiwan at present, the task could become less daunting in the years to come. Four years ago, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley testified before Congress that China hopes to, by 2027, develop the capability to invade and hold Taiwan. To that end, China has dramatically outstripped the US in its acquisition of advanced weapons platforms and equipment and increased the speed at which it can build and deploy new ships to the Taiwan Strait. China recently debuted ships that can connect with one another to form traversable bridges to assist with landing troops, which one expert described as having been “purpose-built for a Taiwan invasion scenario.” China could utilize its ever-increasing stockpile of ballistic missiles to degrade Taiwan’s air and sea defenses, reducing the ability of the Taiwanese military to oppose such an invasion. China could also seek to subdue Taiwan without ever setting foot on land by blockading and implementing a no-fly zone around the island, deploying sea mines outside Taiwanese ports, and cutting the undersea cables to disrupt communication. Such measures would be devastating for an island that imports 70% of its food and 97% of its energy, and would also make it significantly easier for China to eventually launch a full-scale invasion.
China’s desire for unification with Taiwan is unlikely to dissipate anytime soon, even if Trump succeeds in securing a new trade deal with China. Xi has insisted that reunification must occur by the 100th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China’s formation (2049). Taiwan holds significant strategic value for China, not only because controlling it would help expand and enhance China’s sea-denial capabilities in the region and enable it to launch air and sea vessels from the island, but also because of the message its capture would send both domestically and internationally about China’s ascension as the pre-eminent military power in East Asia. Earlier this year, Admiral Samuel Paparo of the United States Indo-Pacific Command assessed that China was conducting military exercises near the island as a “rehearsal” for a potential invasion, of which some analysts believe China is currently capable. A recent piece by Lyle Goldstein argues that, “In a scenario where China attempts an amphibious invasion of Taiwan and the United States does not fight, the invasion will likely succeed assuming Beijing is willing to bear heavy casualties.”
Accordingly, President Trump may be correct that China is unlikely to imminently invade Taiwan, but he overestimates the extent to which America’s status as the “strongest military power in the world by far” would necessarily deter China or help the US prevail in a cross-strait struggle. Victory over China in such a conflict would be hard-won and far from a sure thing. China’s investment in what a Department of Defense report calls “the world’s leading hypersonic missile arsenal” has given China the capacity to seriously threaten American ships, and defense experts have concerns about the capacity of these missiles to outrange American ships operating in the East Asian theater. China also boasts a massive network of satellites which would help the PLA track and target American military assets in the region and make it difficult for the US to disrupt China’s communication capabilities. A 2023 wargame conducted by the Center for Strategic International Studies which projected America and its allies succeeding more often than not at defeating a conventional amphibious invasion of Taiwan by China still projected that America would lose between 200-500 aircraft in the conflict, that it would “take decades to replace the dozen or more such ships lost,” and that the US would “sustain as many personnel casualties in a month of such conflict as in 20 years of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.” Even if America ultimately succeeded at establishing an advantage at sea, China could still target the United States with non-kinetic or cyber-attacks which could be extremely destructive to the US homeland.
So, would America fight to defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion? This is extremely unclear, partly because of America’s deliberate policy of “strategic ambiguity” regarding its commitment to the island. On one hand, America has historically demonstrated a willingness to defend Taiwan, including dispatching carrier groups and even threatening the use of tactical nuclear weapons during past Taiwan Strait crises. On the other hand, there is a sense among many observers that past American support for Taiwan may not portend a continued commitment to its defense. Some experts have even speculated that Trump could offer an end of American support for Taiwan as a bargaining chip in negotiations with Xi to pursue his long-desired comprehensive trade agreement with China, although Secretary of State Marco Rubio has since pushed back against this notion. Meanwhile, Taiwan faces increased pressure from the Chinese, which sent 61 warplanes across the median line between China and Taiwan over a period of several hours in June 2025 and which surrounded Taiwan with massive military exercises just days after President Lai’s inauguration in 2024. Earlier today, China reaffirmed that it “absolutely will not” rule out the use of force to take Taiwan. In the current context, many in Taipei are inclined to interpret statements from American policymakers about the low risk of a Chinese invasion less as a sign of America’s confidence in its deterrence capabilities and more as an indication of America’s waning concern for Taiwan’s security.
Unsurprisingly, Taiwan is taking action to better ensure its protection in the event of waning American commitment to its defense. Taiwan is boosting its defense spending from 2.5% of its GDP to 3.32% in 2026 and recently conducted the biggest military exercises in the country’s history to practice countering Chinese grey zone tactics. President Lai also announced the creation of a Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee in 2024 to prepare the island to withstand security threats at every level and mobilize communities to help defend against and mitigate the effects of a Chinese attack. Such measures reflect Taiwan’s recognition of the omnipresent threat posed by China and the need for the island to bear a larger share of the burden in preparing its defenses.
However, even as Taiwan strengthens its defenses, America cannot afford to dismiss the threat China poses to Taiwan or the implications of the island democracy falling under Chinese control. Regardless of whether America ultimately determines defending Taiwan to be in its national interest, Chinese control of the island would invariably increase the PRC’s regional power projection capabilities and spark significant concerns among America’s regional allies such as the Philippines and Japan about whether America is willing to defend them against a revanchist China. Xi’s assurances to President Trump about Taiwan’s short-term safety aside, a sustained American commitment to deterring Chinese aggression towards Taiwan remains important for reducing the risk of naval conflict in East Asia—whether an attack by China is imminent or not.
Matthew Reisener is the Senior National Security Advisor at the Center for Maritime Strategy.
The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.